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The reader should be forewarned: I make no claim to being a disinterested observer
in the battle for separation of powers in Rhode Island. I was an activist in that struggle, and
served as Chair of the Separation of Powers Task Force for Common Cause of Rhode Island
and Vice President of the Rhode Island Separation of Powers Committee.
Portions of this article are adapted from CARL T. BOGUS, WHY LAWSUITS ARE GOOD
FOR AMERICA: DISCIPLINED DEMOCRACY, BIG BUSINESS AND THE COMMON LAW (2001); Carl
T. Bogus, A Radical Decision by the R.I. Supreme Court, R.I. BAR J., Nov. 1999, at 13; and
Carl T. Bogus, Speaker's Clout Enfeebles Members, PROVIDENCE J., May 22, 2002, at B6.
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INTRODUCTION
"It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system," Louis Brandeis
famously said, "that a single courageous State may, if its citizens choose,
serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments
without risk to the rest of the country.' As his quotation makes clear,
Brandeis was talking about social and economic experiments, not political
ones, and about experiments sanctioned by the people. Yet, since joining
the Republic in 1790, Rhode Island has been conducting something of a
political experiment-and an extreme one at that.
Notwithstanding comments by James Madison about how Rhode
Island's experiment placed it outside the central ideology of the American
founders, Rhode Island continued for more than two centuries to reject one
of the most fundamental principles of American government, namely the
doctrine of separation of powers. That rejection, at times ambiguous and
later explicit, was never sanctioned by the people. Quite the contrary, it
took two revolutions to bring separation of powers into Rhode Island
government: the Dorr Rebellion of 1840 to 1842 and a powerful citizens'
movement beginning in 1994, and barring the unforeseen, culminating in a
constitutional amendment providing for separation of powers to be ratified
by the voters in the fall of 2004.2
The central theme of this article is that separation of powers is at the core
of American ideology. It is not an optional feature in American
government. Rather, separation of powers is part of the essence of
American government, as fundamental as the vote or representative
government. One of the greatest lessons of the Rhode Island experience is
that separation of powers is the people's creed. The state supreme court
handed down opinions attempting to honor Rhode Island's exceptionalism.
For unique historical circumstances, the court argued, Rhode Island never
adopted separation of powers for state government. Some scholars found
1. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
2. See Liz Anderson, General Assembly Unanimously Approves Separation of Powers,
PROVIDENCE J., July 1, 2003, at A-01 (including the text of the constitutional amendment).
For descriptions of the issues leading up to final passage, see also Liz Anderson, Unity
Sought in Separation, PROVIDENCE J., Apr. 10, 2003, at B-01; Liz Anderson, House in
Accord on 'Powers' Plan, PROVIDENCE J., May 16, 2003, at A-01; Liz Anderson,
'Separation' Bill Draws Skepticism, PROVIDENCE J., May 20, 2003, at B-01; Liz Anderson,
House OKs Separation of Powers, 71 to 1, PROVIDENCE J., May 22, 2003, at A-01; Edward
Fitzpatrick, Senate OKs Power Separation, PROVIDENCE J., May 31, 2002, at B-01; Liz
Anderson, Language Delays Powers Bill, PROVIDENCE J., June 12, 2003, at B-01. Among
the many op-ed articles of interest regarding the language of the amendment are: Robert P.
Nicholas Gorham, Article 6, Section 10: A Provision Madison Would Strike, PROVIDENCE J.,
Mar. 11, 2003, at B-05; Carl T. Bogus, Separation-of-Powers End Game: House Must Enact
Real Reform, PROVIDENCE J., Apr. 4, 2003, at B-07; Editorial, Brink of Reform, PROVIDENCE
J., May 16, 2003, at B-04.
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this reasonable.3 The people were inflamed.
The Rhode Island experience shows that the people see separation of
powers at the doctrinal center of the American political system; for them, it
is dn essential idea reflecting the social needs and aspirations of America.4
The people see it as part of their American heritage, adopted by the
Founders in Philadelphia in 1788, handed down through the generations,
and guaranteed to the people of every state.
I shall support this proposition historically, theoretically, and
anecdotally. The people of Rhode Island undertook a modem revolution
not principally because they found separation of powers appealing in
theory, but because they thought it would make a critical difference in
practice. This article deals with specific episodes in recent Rhode Island
history and how the people perceived them to be relevant to separation of
powers.
One of my goals is to stimulate the interest of researchers in studying the
battle for separation of powers in Rhode Island, a history worthy of study
for a couple of reasons. Rhode Island represents the most extreme rejection
of the principle of separation of powers in the history of the Republic.
Separation of powers is, of course, a relative concept. As James Madison
himself made plain, as a practical matter there neither can nor should be
3. Patrick T. Conley, a professor emeritus of history and constitutional law at
Providence College, defends the status quo in PATRICK T. CONLEY, NEITHER SEPARATE NOR
EQUAL: LEGISLATURE AND EXECUTIVE IN RHODE ISLAND CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY (1999).
Professors Elmer E. Cornwell, Jr. and Jay S. Goodman, of the political science departments
of Brown University and Wheaton College respectively, endorse Conley's views in their
Foreword to his book. Cornwell has been on the Rhode Island legislative payroll, receiving
a salary of $46,811.96 in 2002. Katherine Gregg, Taxpayers: The Cost of Your Part-Time
Legislature Has Doubled in 10 Years, PROVIDENCE J., Jan. 12, 2003, at A-01. In addition to
being an academic, Goodman also works as a lobbyist, representing unions before the
Rhode Island General Assembly.
Testifying before the House committee considering separation of powers on Apr. 2,
2003, Professor Alan Rosenthal of the political science department at Rutgers University-
New Brunswick, who characterized himself as "nearly" a legislative supremacist,
questioned the desirability of adopting separation of powers in state government.
At a symposium on separation of powers at the Roger Williams University School
of Law, Professor Grant D. Reeher, a political scientist at Syracuse University and a co-
author of the Kersh article cited below, said he was not troubled by legislative appointees
sitting on boards that control executive agencies. Doane Hulick, Separation-of-Powers
Debate Leaves Legal Scholars Divided; The Question of Whether Lawmakers Should Serve
on Executive Agencies Has Been Put to the Rhode Island Supreme Court, PROVIDENCE J.,
Apr. 26, 1998, at E-01.
For a variety of scholarly views, see Symposium, Separation of Powers in State
Constitutional Law, 4 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 1 (1998) (containing articles by Rogan
Kersh et al., Michael C. Dorf, Robert A. Shapiro, James A. Gardener, Richard A. Hogarty,
and Robert F. Williams). One common theme running through the articles by Kersh, Dorf,
Shapiro, and Gardener is the view that it is undesirable for all of the states to adopt
wholesale either federal doctrine or any other uniform formulation of separation of powers.
4. I follow the definition of "ideology" found in THE AMERICAN HERITAGE
DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 422 (4th ed. 2001).
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absolute separation of powers among the branches of government.5 An
intermingling of powers is both necessary and desirable. For example, the
President and most governors participate in legislative activity through
their veto power and influence the judiciary by virtue of their role in
selecting judges. As scholars put it, separation of powers should be
conceived in functional rather than formal terms.6
Many have noted that separation of powers is not a single idea, but a
cluster of concepts, including theories of sovereignty, division of authority,
balanced government, and checks between the branches.7 Nevertheless,
separation of powers is mainly about two principles. The first springs from
the belief that power has a pernicious effect on human nature. In Lord
Acton's famous axiom: "Power tends to corrupt and absolute power
corrupts absolutely."8  Thus, too much power should not reside in one
place. The second principle is rooted in the belief that any person or group
possesses limited wisdom and even the majority's collective wisdom can
be overcome by passions of the moment. Thus, there need to be checks
and balances to guard not only against corruption but improvident or
impetuous decisions as well.
There is no single way to meet these objectives, and the fifty state
governments differ considerably in how they attempt to do so. They differ
as well as to what extent they seek equipoise among the branches. There
are, for example, states with relatively strong or weak governors. Rhode
Island, however, has been beyond the far end of the spectrum. No other
state legislature has claimed to be "omnipotent, ' '9 or told the state's highest
court that the government consisted of only two coequal branches of
government-the legislative and judicial branches, and a "diminutive"
5. E.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 47 (James Madison) (J.B. Lippincott & Co. ed., 1866)
("On the slightest view of the British Constitution [which Montesquieu praised], we must
perceive that the legislative, executive, and judicial departments are by no means totally
separate and distinct from each other."); THE FEDERALIST No. 48 (James Madison) (J.B.
Lippincott & Co. ed., 1866) ("It was shown in the last paper that the political apothegm
there examined does not require that the legislative, executive, and judiciary departments
should be wholly unconnected with each other."); id (Madison goes on to write that the
object is to prevent one department from "directly and completely" administering powers
properly belonging to another department or to possess "an overruling influence over the
others in the administration of their respective powers.").
6. See, e.g., Harold J. Krent, Separating the Strands in Separation of Powers
Controversies, 74 VA. L. REV. 1253 (1988) (examining the debate between the two
approaches to resolving separation of powers issues).
7. Garry Wills does a particularly fine job of demonstrating this. See GARRY WILLS,
EXPLAINING AMERICA: THE FEDERALIST 97-175 (1981).
8. Letter to Mandell Creighton, Apr. 5, 1887, quoted in THE INTERNATIONAL
THESAURUS OF QUOTATIONS 493 (Rhoda Thomas Tripp, ed. 1970). I do not take the concept
of corruption to be limited to conscious self-aggrandizement but to also embrace the
problems of hubris and conflicts of interest.
9. See City of Providence v. Moulton, 160 A. 75, 77 (R.I. 1932) (tracing phrase that
"the legislature was omnipotent" to a 1844 House of Representatives report).
[56:1
SEPARATION OF POWERS IN RHODE ISLAND
Governor. 10 Nor have the courts of any other state held that its government
was a "quintessential parliamentary supremacy."" In addition, no other
state has had a dissenting justice on the state's highest court write that his
colleagues were reducing the Governor to "the functional equivalent of a
show captain, propped up on the ship of the state's maindeck in full-dress
regalia for all the passengers to ogle, while the real legislative bosses
steered the ship, barked orders, and hired, fired, and supervised the crew
and all those who toiled away in the boiler rooms below.' ' 12 Rhode Island
did not merely move to the end of the spectrum; it sought to adopt a
different paradigm.
This is a topic with wider ramifications. In many states, there are
increasing legislative encroachments into executive and judicial spheres, a
new gathering of power into the impetuous legislative vortex. 13  In
Massachusetts and New Hampshire, for example, there have been serious
questions about whether the legislature might reduce the pay of judges, end
lifetime appointment of judges, or perhaps even impeach judges in
retaliation for judicial decisions regarding legislative apportionment or
campaign finance. 14  The greatest trend is increasing legislative control
over executive agencies. In Pennsylvania, legislative appointments to
executive agencies are growing, with what one knowledgeable
commentator calls "pernicious results."'15 In Illinois, North Carolina, Ohio,
Pennsylvania, Wisconsin, and other states, there is a trend toward
aggressive "rules review,"' 16 where legislatures do not merely exercise
10. See Almond v. R.I. Lottery Comm'n, 756 A.2d 186, 204 (R.I. 2000) (Flanders, J.,
dissenting) (quoting brief by House of Representatives).
11. See infra note 24 and accompanying text.
12. In re Advisory Opinion to the Governor (R.I. Ethics Comm'n-Separation of
Powers), 732 A.2d 55, 100 (R.I. 1999) (Flanders, J., dissenting).
13. In referring to the impetuous legislative vortex, I am paraphrasing Madison. See
infra note 87 and accompanying text.
14. See John DiStaso, Tangled Issues Abound in Judges' Suit for Fees: High Court
Urges Legislators Not to Curb Court's Authority, UNION LEADER (Manchester, N.H.), Mar.
14, 200 1, at B3; Nancy Meersman, Judiciary vs. Legislature, UNION LEADER (Manchester,
N.H.), Nov. 2, 2002, at Al; Frank Phillips, Judges Ask SJC to Restore Appointment Power:
Say Lawmakers' Move Saps Judicial Role, BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 5, 2002, at B1, B8;
Christine MacDonald, New Hampshire Conducts Trial to Impeach High Court Justice, CHI.
TRIB., Sept. 20, 2000, at § 1-5; Steve Marantz, Finneran Considers Reining in Judiciary
Over Clean Elections, BOSTON HERALD, Feb. 8, 2002, at 14; Editorial, Finneran in
Contempt, BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 10, 2002, at C12; Aviam Soifer, Editorial, Legislators Seek
to Undermine State's Separation of Powers, BOSTON HERALD, Oct. 13, 2002, at 30
(discussing the debate over separation of powers issues in Massachusetts and New
Hampshire).
15. John C. Pittenger, Editorial, Pernicious Legislative Role in Pennsylvania,
PROVIDENCE J., July 24, 2002, at B-05. Pittenger has at various times served as a member of
the Pennsylvania legislature, the state's secretary of education, and member of the state
board of education. He is also formerly a professor of law and dean at the Rutgers
University School of Law--Camden.
16. See JAMES R. BOWERS, REGULATING THE REGULATORS: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE
LEGISLATIVE OVERSIGHT OF ADMINISTRATIVE RULEMAKING 24-25 (1990) (identifying
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general oversight of the promulgation of rules and regulations by executive
agencies, but also reserve to a committee or other entity, controlled by
legislators, the authority to suspend or veto regulations, a practice that the
United States Supreme Court has held to be unconstitutional within the
federal government.
17
Aggressive rules review often yields political results with legislators
weakening regulations to curry favor with constituents and contributors.
18
Moreover, the more legislatures acquire control over regulatory agencies,
the more they weaken executive power and inflate their own. When
legislative oversight of agencies drifts into supervision, legislative control
becomes dominant, for the agency must look to the legislature not only for
funding but also for continuing and specific approval of its work product.
In practice, this means the legislature will dictate the agencies' work
product.19 The Rhode Island experience has lessons for other states. It
illuminates both the peril of permitting greater concentration of legislative
power and the ability to rally the people against it.
Although the campaign for separation of powers can be traced back more
than 160 years, when a young lawyer named Thomas Wilson Dorr sought
to overturn the existing Rhode Island government, the modem effort began
in 1994 when Common Cause of Rhode Island made separation of powers
its most important political priority.
The genesis was alarm about the legislature's expanding practice of
reserving to itself the power to appoint the controlling officials of executive
agencies. When the Roger Williams University Law Review published its
inaugural issue in the spring of 1996, the lead article by then U.S. Attorney
Wisconsin, Pennsylvania, Illinois, and eleven other states that allow legislative suspension
of administrative regulations); see also Jim Rossi, Institutional Design and the Lingering
Legacy of Antifederalist Separation of Powers Ideals in the States, 52 VAND. L. REv. 1167,
1213-14 (1999) (discussing North Carolina, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and other states).
17. Even a veto by one chamber of Congress alone, or by both chambers without
presentment to the President for signature or veto, is prohibited. See INS v. Chadha, 462
U.S. 919, 946 (1983).
18. See BOWERS, supra note 16, at 50-55 (elaborating on the effect of aggressive rules
review). An official at one Illinois agency told a researcher: "The more politically
motivated [an objection by a legislative committee] appears to be, the greater the likelihood
that this agency will comply with it. We don't want to antagonize legislators who may
retaliate against us elsewhere in the legislative process." Id. at 72. See also Marcus E.
Ethridge, III, Legislative-Administrative Interaction as "Intrusive Access": An Empirical
Analysis, 43 J. OF POLITICS 473, 480 (1981) (quoting Harold Bruff and Ernest Gellhorn, who
stated that a congressional veto over administrative regulations alters the powers balance
between Congress and the President).
19. Agencies cannot afford to expend time and resources promulgating regulations only
to have the legislature veto them at the end of a long process. See generally BOGUS, WHY
LAWSUITS ARE GOOD FOR AMERICA, supra note *, at 145-59 (describing how agencies
cannot afford to invest years and resources to develop rules that ultimately never go into
effect or are overturned). This will force agencies to include powerful legislators or their
surrogates in the drafting process, where they will be the most influential participants.
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Sheldon Whitehouse was titled "Appointments by the Legislature Under
the Rhode Island Separation of Powers Doctrine: The Hazards of the Road
Less Traveled. 2°  Mr. Whitehouse was concerned about the General
Assembly's exercising "virtually unchecked appointment powers" over
executive agencies in many substantive areas, from the commission
regulating gambling to the agency charged with protecting the coastal
environments of the state. 21 Two cases challenging the practice as violating
the doctrine of separation of powers had reached the state supreme court; in
both instances the court avoided reaching a decision on the merits. 22 No
one could say if the issue would finally be resolved by the courts, but it was
the place to begin.
As it turned out, the Rhode Island Supreme Court subsequenetly handed
down two opinions, in 1999 and 2000, that are surely among the most
radical ever rendered by the highest court of an American state.23 The
court proclaimed that Rhode Island does not have the same fundamental
system of government found in the federal system and the other forty-nine
states. Rather, Rhode Island government is "that of a quintessential system
of parliamentary supremacy.,24 The court concluded that Rhode Island
does not have three co-equal branches of government and that the General
Assembly is supreme. In Rhode Island, the General Assembly's power is
not limited to the authority granted to it by the state constitution; the
General Assembly possesses "all of the powers inhering in sovereignty"
except for authority expressly granted to other branches of government.
25
20. 1 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REv. 1 (1996).
21. Id. at 2.
22. See id (highlighting two major separation of powers cases in Rhode Island).
23. Almond v. R.I. Lottery Comm'n, 756 A.2d 186 (2000); In re Advisory Opinion to
the Governor, 732 A.2d 55 (R.I. 1999).
24. In re Advisory Opinion to the Governor, 732 A.2d at 64.
25. Id. at 62-63. As the Tenth Amendment emphasizes, the federal government is a
government of limited powers, possessing only those powers expressly or implicitly granted
to it in the United States Constitution, while all other powers are "reserved to the States,
respectively, or to the people." U.S. CONST. amend. X. Writing for the Supreme Court,
Benjamin Cardozo said that, "How power shall be distributed by a state among its
governmental organs is commonly, if not always, a question for the state itself" Highland
Farms Diary, Inc. v. Agnew, 300 U.S. 608, 612 (1937).
As a matter of abstract political theory, it is interesting to ask what happens to any
residual powers that are not doled out in the state constitution to the executive, legislative,
or judicial branches of government. Where do they reside? This, however, may only be an
academic question because as a practical matter it is difficult to imagine governmental
power that cannot be classified as legislative, executive, judicial, or some combination
thereof.
Not everyone concedes that residual power belongs to the government. Philip
Bobbitt wrote that it is a fundamental ethos of our constitutional system that "all residual
authority remains in the private sphere." Philip Bobbitt, Is Law Politics?, 41 STAN. L. REv.
1233, 1284 (1989). But one pretty much gets to the same place by conceding that the
legislature may enact a law of any kind or stripe, subject only to constitutional limitations,
which among other things require that laws be rationally related to a valid public purpose.
This is sometimes called "plenary power," meaning the legislature's law-making authority is
2004]
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The campaign then turned into a political effort to amend the state
constitution, seemingly a fool's errand. As a practical matter, the state
constitution could not be amended without the consent of the General
Assembly itself.26  How, without enormous political pressure, would a
legislature be made to give up such power? Such pressure could only come
from the public, from voters making it clear that legislators would have to
amend the constitution or be voted out of office. But was it possible to
arouse the public over an arcane issue of political theory?
In 1999, I embarked on a project to publish a full page advertisement in
the Providence Journal-Bulletin in which forty teachers of law, history, and
politics in the state's colleges and universities would proclaim the
importance of separation of powers. Philip H. West, Jr., the executive
director of Common Cause and one of the key leaders of the movement,
found a benefactor willing to pay most of the cost of the ad.27 My job was
to get at least forty signatories, and I expected it to be easy. I anticipated
difficulty in the state's three public colleges 28 which are funded by the
General Assembly and controlled by boards with legislative appointees.
Nevertheless, the state's seven private colleges29 provided a more than
ample pool to recruit the required amount of supporters-or so I thought.
I got off to a fine start when sixteen of my colleagues at the Roger
Williams University School of Law agreed to sign the ad. But, to my
amazement, I could not get even close to the necessary twenty-four
additional signatures from all of the state's other institutions of higher
learning. It was not for want of trying. I worked the phones diligently,
calling nearly everyone I could reach in the departments of history and
not delimited by a list of subject matter but extends to any valid public purpose.
The concepts of residual power or plenary power, however, cannot be properly used
to justify the legislature appropriating to itself (or delegating to an entity that it controls or
influences)-not some untraditional or unclassifiable power-but executive powers,
including implied or unenumerated executive powers.
26. There are two ways to get around the state constitution: (1) by a majority vote in
each chamber of the Grand Assembly, together with ratification by a majority of voters at
the next general election; or (2) a constitutional convention, convened in one of two ways.
R.I. CONST. art. XIV, §§ 1, 2. Reform forces would have faced insurmountable odds by
taking the constitutional convention route, which in theory might have been called without
the consent of the General Assembly. First, members of the General Assembly, politicians
with name recognition and support of party regulars, would have had enormous advantages
in standing for election to be delegates. Second, the reform coalition would have been
driven asunder by wedge issues such as abortion, gun control, and tort reform.
27. I asked each signatory for a contribution of only $35.00, which would cover only a
small fraction of the cost. In my judgment, the ad needed to be signed by at least forty
professors to carry the desired weight; and I promised the signers that we would not run the
ad without at least forty names.
28. Community College of Rhode Island, Rhode Island College, and the University of
Rhode Island.
29. Brown University, Bryant College, Johnson & Wales University, Providence
College, Rhode Island School of Design, Roger Williams University, and Salve Regina
College.
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political science. I spoke to one professor who told me she did not want to
sign because her specialty was international relations and she had never
studied separation of powers. "It's complicated and I don't know enough
about it," she said.a° If this was too complicated for a political scientist, no
matter what her specialty, how was it going to be simple enough for the
public at large?
Many knowledgeable people-not only scholars, but successful
politicians and public relations experts-concluded that it would be
impossible to generate sufficient public interest in separation of powers to
mount a credible campaign to amend the state constitution.3' The issue was
too arcane, abstract, and complicated to explain to the voters. People
would focus instead on issues of obvious bread and butter significance,
such as taxes and schools.
The stunning surprise is that separation of powers became the biggest
issue in the state. When the candidates campaigned, it was typically the
topic that voters asked about first and most often. Newspapers and radio
talk shows became filled with discussions about separation of powers. The
Providence Journal published nearly 800 news articles, editorials,
32
commentary pieces, or letters-to-the-editor about separation of powers.
Community groups held forums about separation of powers.33 Members of
the General Assembly lost seats over the issue.34
Separation of powers turned out to be an issue that the public grasped
intuitively and cared about passionately-an issue that is paradoxically too
complicated for professors of history and political science and starkly clear
to the average person. Separation of powers is about consolidated power,
and that is something the public understands.
Part II of this Article describes the theoretical and historical basis for my
argument that separation of powers is a central feature of American
30. Or words to that effect.
31. 1 state this from first-hand knowledge, but because the conversations were private I
will not identify individuals.
32. A Lexis search conducted on June 5, 2003 produced 791 documents that included
the term "separation of powers" published in the Providence Journal-Bulletin from January
1, 2003 forward.
33. Here is a small sample of such events (ones in which I happened to participate)
during the last eighteen months of the campaign: Panel Discussion: "State of the State"
(cable television broadcast, filmed May 8, 2003); Debate, Rotary Club of Providence, R.I.,
(Mar. 31, 2003); Forum, Common Cause of R.I., (Mar. 19, 2003); Debate, St. Michael's
Episcopal Church, Bristol, R.I. (Mar. 13, 2003); Luncheon Talk, Roger Williams University
School of Law (Mar. 11, 2003); Evening Talk, College Republicans at Roger Williams
University (Feb. 12, 2003); Luncheon Talk, Rotary Club of Bristol, R.I. (Feb. 26, 2003);
Forum, Newport Chamber of Commerce, Newport, R.I. (Jan. 27, 2003); Forum, Operation
Clean Government, Rhodes on the Pawtuxet, R.I. (Jan. 20, 2003); "Focus Rhode Island,"
WRNI, Providence, R.I., (Oct. 18, 2002); Luncheon Talk, Netopian Club of Providence,
(Apr. 24, 2002); Talk, First Baptist Church in America, Providence, R.I., (Apr. 14, 2002).
34. See infra note 251 and accompanying text.
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ideology. Part III describes the relevant Rhode Island history, including, in
broad terms, how and why Rhode Island came to reject separation of
powers and perhaps most importantly the problems that resulted from that
rejection. This section deals in some length with regulatory agencies
because they have experienced the greatest ramifications. From 1842 until
the Rhode Island Supreme Court decisions in 1999 and 2000, there was
uncertainty about whether the Rhode Island constitution incorporated the
principle of separation of powers. Growing legislative control over
administrative agencies caused then-Governor Lincoln Almond to ask the
court to resolve the question; and it was the court's decisions-and fear
that with the issue resolved in the General Assembly's favor, the legislature
would assert even greater control over agencies-that ignited the campaign
to amend the state constitution. That effort successfully culminated in July
2003.35 Part IV of this Article describes the culmination of the battle.
This is by no means a complete recounting of the battle for separation of
powers. Although I allude to the decisions of the state supreme court to
make a variety of points, I do not analyze them comprehensively. I do not
deal with the full body of Rhode Island case law about separation of
powers. I do not describe in detail the chronology of the political struggle
for a constitutional amendment, and I do not discuss the process of
drafting, fighting, and negotiating over the language of the amendment or
present any exegesis of the language itself. These are all important
subjects, but they must await another day.
This story is about why the battle for separation of powers was fought.
I. SEPARATION OF POWERS AND AMERICAN IDEOLOGY
A. Ideological Origins
One of the first modem political philosophers to recognize the
importance of separation of powers was Niccolo Machiavelli.36
Machiavelli argued that the government of Sparta had been so enormously
successful because its great lawgiver, Lycurgus, created a constitution that
divided and balanced power among three separate organs of government,
35. This is the date on which the General Assembly passed a proposed constitutional
amendment. The amendment will not become effective unless it is ratified by the voters at
the general election in November 2004.
36. In his grand survey of western philosophy Bertrand Russell mentions Machiavelli
first on this topic. See BERTRAND RUSSELL, A HISTORY OF WESTERN PHILOSOPIHY 508
(1945). However, every thinker stands on the shoulders of predecessors, and Machiavelli
was strongly influenced by Polybius, who in turn was influenced by Aristotle. See FORREST
MCDONALD, Novos ORDO SECLORUM: THE INTELLECTUAL ORIGINS OF THE CONSTITUTION
80-81 (1985) (highlighting the influence of Aristotle and Polybius, among others); see also
WILLS, supra note 7, at 98-101 (offering an excellent summary of Polybius's thinking).
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controlled respectively by the kings, the aristocrats, and the people.37
Sparta had two concurrent kings, with limited powers, who performed
religious ceremonies of ritualistic importance to the state, were in charge of
the judiciary, and commanded the army during times of war.38 Sparta's
Senate was composed of twenty-eight aristocrats, who were elected from
those eligible by the Assembly.3 9 The sovereignty of the state was formally
in the Assembly, comprised of all males over the age of thirty, which had
the authority to enact laws. Sometime after Lycurgus, the Spartan
constitution was amended so that the Senate could veto laws that, in its
view, had been "crookedly" decided by the Assembly.4 °
Machievelli credited the wisdom of Lycurgus for creating a government
that lasted for more than 800 years.41 By comparison, he argued, Athens'
lawgiver, Solon, failed to create a governmental structure that provided a
check on either "the insolence of the upper class" or "the abuse of freedom
on the part of the populace," each of which ran rampant at different times.
As a result, said Machiavelli, "Athens endured a very brief time in
comparison to Sparta.
4 3
In the seventeenth century, English political philosophers, struggling
with nascent concepts of democracy, began thinking about separating and
balancing powers between King and Parliament. Thomas Hobbes opposed
this concept.44 He preferred an outright monarchy, and could abide a
supreme Parliament instead but believed a government of divided power
between King and Parliament was intolerable.45 John Locke disagreed. In
1698, he wrote:
[B]ecause it may be too great a temptation to human frailty apt to grasp
at power, for the same persons who have the power of making laws, to
have also in their hands the power to execute them, whereby they may
exempt themselves from obedience to the laws they make, and suit the
37. See NICCOLO MACHIAVELLI, DISCOURSES ON LIvY 20 (Harvey C. Mansfield and
Nathan Tarcov trans., Univ. of Chicago Press 1996) (1512) (discussing the structure of
government in ancient Sparta).
38. See WILL DURANT, THE LIFE OF GREECE 79 (1939) (describing the structure of and
power distribution in the Spartan govenment).
39. See id. at 79-80.
40. See id. at 80.
41. See MACHIAVELLI, supra note 37, at 26-27 (providing an analysis of the historical
establishment of laws and government and distinguishing between those governments which
allocated power responsibly and those that did not).
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. See THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN, pt. 2, ch. 29, § 16 (J.C.A. Gaskin ed., Oxford
Univ. Press 1996) (1651) (proclaiming a government with separate powers to be a "disease
in the natural body of man").
45. "[W]hat is it to divide the power of a commonwealth, but to dissolve it? for [sic]
powers divided mutually destroy each other." Id. ch. 29. See also RUSSELL, supra note 36,
at 551 (noting that Hobbes preferred governments ruled by a single power rather than
separate entities).
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law, both in its making and execution, to their own private advantage,
and thereby come to have a distinct interest from the rest of the
community, contrary to the end of society and government ... 46
Many give Locke the lion's share of the credit for originating the
doctrine of separation of powers.47 Although Locke was quite clear about
the malady-the perniciousness of consolidated power-and prescribed a
division between the legislative and executive authorities in a general
sense, he was far from clear about how this was to be accomplished. He
believed that the legislative authority (which might vest in a body or a
single individual) was at the same time both the supreme power and subject
to constraints. Namely, he believed that the legislative authority cannot
enact arbitrary laws or issue arbitrary decrees, and its power "is limited to
the public good of the society. 4 8  But whether there should be any
enforcing mechanism Locke fails to say. Although Locke does not
envision a separate judicial branch of government, 49 he does at least in part
recognize the importance of the rule of law. The legislative authority "is
bound to dispense justice, and decide the rights of the subject by
promulgated standing laws, and known authorized judges,, 50 he wrote. But
again, he prescribes no formal check on legislative power. His comments
seem purely hortatory; he argues that it is wise to entrust decisions to
authorized judges because those "who through passion or interest" have
violated the unwritten natural law "cannot so easily be convinced of their
mistake where there is no established judge," and leaves it at that. 51
Two events undoubtedly stimulated Locke's thinking. The first event
was the English Civil War, which in 1649 resulted in the trial and
execution of Charles I and the abolition of both the monarchy and the
House of Lords. After the King's assassination and the consolidation of
power in the House of Commons, the dangers of legislative supremacy
52became apparent. Eleven years of rule by the House of Commons alone
46. JOHN LOCKE, Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT, bk. 1I, ch. 2, § 143 (Mark Goldie
ed., Everyman 2000) (1698).
47. E.g., M.J.C. VILE, CONSTITUTIONALISM AND THE SEPARATION OF POWERS 63 (2d ed.
1998) (recognizing the scholarly debate over who developed the separation of powers theory
and crediting Locke); JACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS: POLITICS AND IDEAS IN THE
MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION 247 (1996); GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE
AMERICAN REPUBLIC 1776-1787, at 151 (1969).
48. LOCKE, supra note 46 § 135, at 183-84.
49. See, e.g., James E. Pfander, Sovereign Immunity and the Right to Petition, 91 Nw.
U. L. REv. 899, 921 n.82 (1997) (noting that Locke did not include the judiciary as an
independent branch of government); Jonathan M. Hoffman, By the Course of the Law, 74
OR. L. REV. 1279, 1315 (1995) (explaining that Locke did not endorse the judiciary as a
separate branch of government).
50. LOCKE, supra note 46, at 184 § 136.
51. Id.
52. Despite restoration of the monarchy in 1660, the problems of parliamentary
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was enough to convince England that consolidating all power in one set of
hands, even a body of the people's elected representatives, was a recipe for
disaster; as a result, resurrection of both the monarch and the House of
Lords ensued.53 From this point on, British thinkers began to argue that
Parliament should be limited to enacting general laws and that the
operation of government should be the province of the executive, subject to
legislative review.1
4
The second event that stimulated Locke's thinking was the Glorious
Revolution of 1689. James II failed to recognize parliamentary
prerogatives, and in a bloodless revolution, Parliament replaced him with a
new monarch, William of Orange. 55 As a condition of gaining the crown,
William recognized the principle that Parliament was the sole source of
law. Thus, the primitive thinking about separation of powers gained some
degree of acceptance by the government itself.
However, two post-Medieval theories continued to influence thinking
about separation of powers.56 The first theory (evident in Machiavelli's
writing about Sparta) was that the nation consisted of three separate
interests or estates-the monarch, the aristocracy, and the people-which
were entitled to participate in government, but did so as a combined, single
governmental institution, namely Parliament.57 The second theory involved
58
the concept of sovereignty. As traditional conceptions held, the
personification or embodiment of the nation itself must rest somewhere, in
a single person or institution. As Edmund S. Morgan brilliantly illustrated,
this idea undoubtedly derived from the divine right of kings, the idea that
God appointed the King--"that kings were visible gods and God an
invisible king," 59 as the Speaker intoned when opening every session of the
House of Commons-to lead a people and constitute a nation.60 It was
supremacy were evident, but the solution of separated powers had not yet been fully worked
out. See RAKOVE, supra note 47, at 245-46 (describing the development of the separation
of powers in England and America). The Glorious Revolution of 1689 was a landmark in
the creation of British democracy; it was not until the end of the eighteenth century that the
transfer of executive authority from monarch to prime minister and cabinet began.
53. See id at 246 (summarizing the evolution of England's government of separate
spheres).
54. See id. (explaining the political theories developed regarding England's separation
of powers).
55. See Carl T. Bogus, The Hidden History of the Second Amendment, 31 U.C. DAVIS L.
REV. 309, 383 (1998) [hereinafter, Hidden History] (describing how Parliament's power
increased along with William of Orange's ascension to the throne).
56. See infra notes 57-63 and accompanying text.
57. See RAKOVE, supra note 47, at 245 (describing "the English theory of mixed
government").
58. The second theory focused on the separate roles of the executive, legislative, and
judicial branches of government. Id. at 245-46.
59. EDMUND S. MORGAN, INVENTING THE PEOPLE: THE RISE OF POPULAR SOVEREIGNTY
IN ENGLAND AND AMERICA 19 (1998).
60. See generally id. at 17-29 (theorizing about the development of the ideology that the
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only natural, therefore, that when monarchy slowly began to give way to
democracy, Englishmen perceived this as a shift of sovereignty and
supreme authority from King to Parliament. Thus, in 1765 Blackstone
wrote that Parliament was "coequal with the kingdom itself' 61 and that its
power was "transcendent and absolute., 62 Or as another commentator put
it, since England's civil war "the only ultimate source of law is the King in
Parliament.,
63
Nevertheless, from the Glorious Revolution onward, there gradually
developed, through fits and starts and with much confusion, a practical
division between executive authority residing in the King and legislative
authority residing in Parliament, and with checks and balances between
them.64 Only the monarch could convene or dissolve Parliament; only
Parliament could make law; and the bicameral nature of Parliament
prevented the enactment of any law without the consent of both the
aristocracy in the House of Lords and the elected representatives of the
people in the House of Commons.65
It was the Baron de Montesquieu who, in his brilliant work, The Spirit of
Laws,66 published in 1751, first pierced the post-Medieval fog and clearly
enunciated the modem concept of separation of powers.67 In a chapter
titled "Of the Constitution of England," Montesquieu wrote:
When the legislative and executive powers are united in the same person,
or in the same body of magistrates, there can be no liberty; because
apprehensions may arise, lest the same monarch or senate should enact
tyrannical laws, to execute them in a tyrannical manner.
Again, there is no liberty, if the judiciary power be not separated from
the legislative and executive. Were it joined with the legislative, the life
and liberty of the subject would be exposed to arbitrary control; for the
King is a divine source of power, which the Commons ultimately utilized as a method of
restricting the King's power by limiting his authority to his own actions).
61. WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, BLACKSTONE's COMMENTARIES ABRIDGED 36 (William C.
Sprague ed., 9th ed. 1915) (1892).
62. Id. at 38.
63. EDWARD JENKS, A SHORT HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW: FROM THE EARLIEST TIMES TO
THE END OF THE YEAR 1911, at 185 (1912).
64. "For centuries [prior to the American Revolution] Englishmen had bragged about
their mixed government, in which executive, legislative, and judiciary powers were
allegedly balanced against each other." MORGAN, supra note 59, at 261. Whether clarity
about the concept of separation of powers, or even any term or label for it, extends back as
far as Morgan suggests I do not know, but he is certainly correct when he writes that by "the
1780s belief in the separation of powers was widespread." Id.
65. Along with William's rise to power came a recognition of Parliament's authority,
independent of the executive. Hidden History, supra note 55, at 382-83.
66. BARON DE MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF LAWS, bk. XI, ch. 6 (Thomas Nugent
trans., Hafner Publ'g Co. 1949) (1751).
67. Scholars have noted that Montesquieu was influenced by Bolingbroke. See, e.g.,
MCDONALD, supra note 36, at 80 (recognizing the sources of Montesquieu's theories and
how his theories influenced Americans' political theories).
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judge would be then the legislator. Were it joined to the executive
power, the judge might behave with violence and oppression.
There would be an end of everything, were the same man or the same
body, whether of the nobles or of the people, to exercise those three
powers, that of enacting laws, that of executing the public resolutions,
and of trying the causes of individuals.
68
Montesquieu's thinking was far richer and more developed than Locke's.
He devoted an entire chapter to separation of powers, working the
principles out in considerable detail. He argued that most European
kingdoms "enjoy a moderate government ' 69 because they separated and
balanced power in one fashion or another. He compared how Turkey, Italy,
and Holland accomplished this by observing the important ways their
governmental structures emulated those of ancient Rome. He intriguingly
suggested that by reading the Roman historian Tacitus one would discover
that the Romans in turn derived the principle of separation of powers from
the German Huns; "[t]his beautiful system was invented first in the
woods, 70 he observed. Montesquieu also was the first, as far as I know, to
expressly combine within the principle of separation of powers not only the
concept of divided authority but also of checks and balances among the
governmental departments.
Montesquieu wrote that the government of England had the best system
of separation of powers, at least in theory.7 1 However, he predicted that it
would not last; "[a]s all human things have an end, [England] will lose its
liberty, will perish. Have not Rome, Sparta, and Carthage perished? It will
perish when the legislative power shall be more corrupt than the
,,72
executive.
Montesquieu especially influenced the American Founders on the
concept of separation of powers.73 Madison himself sounded much like
Montesquieu when he famously explained that American government
needed to incorporate the principle of separation of powers: "[t]he
accumulation of all powers, legislative, executive, and judiciary, in the
same hands, whether of one, a few, or many, and whether hereditary, self-
appointed, or elective, may justly be pronounced the very definition of
68. MONTESQUIEU, supra note 37, bk XI, ch. 6 at 151-52.
69. Id. at 152.
70. Id. at 161.
71. "It is not my business to examine whether the English actually enjoy this liberty or
not. Sufficient it is for my purpose to observe that it is established by their laws; and I
inquire no further." Id. at 162.
72. MONTESQUtEU, supra note 66, Book XI, Ch. 6 at 161-62.
73. "The oracle who is always consulted and cited on this subject is the celebrated
Montesquieu," said James Madison. THE FEDERALIST No. 47, at 374 (James Madison) (J.B.
Lippincott & Co. ed., 1866). See also MCDONALD, supra note 36, at 81 ("American






And, as we are about to see, the American Founders were especially
worried about Montesquieu's warning that democracies perish because of
the corruption of legislative power.
75
B. Separation of Powers and the American Founders
Virginia's original constitution, adopted in 1776, was the first to
expressly adopt the concept of separation of powers7 6  Nevertheless,
separation of powers was not a widely accepted concept immediately after
the Revolution.77 In their original constitutions, adopted at the outset of the
Revolution, only four states established governments with expressly
separate legislative, executive, and judicial departments.7 8 Moreover,
according to William Wiecek, seven of the state constitutions adopted in
1776 exalted legislative power.79 Pennsylvania did not even have the office
of Governor, and other states gave the office little power.8 0 The judiciary
was either elected by or answerable to the General Assembly.
The Articles of Confederation, adopted in 1777, did not create a judicial
department at all. One could argue that there was no reason for the drafters
74. THE FEDERALIST No. 47, at 373-74 (James Madison) (J.B. Lippincott & Co. ed.,
1866).
75. See infra notes 83-88 and accompanying text.
76. Its first substantive sentence reads: "The legislative, executive, and judiciary
department, shall be separate and distinct, so that neither exercise the powers properly
belonging to the other: nor shall any person exercise the powers of more than one of them,
at the same time; except that the Justices of the County Courts shall be eligible to either
House of Assembly." VA. CONST. OF 1776, in 10 SOURCES AND DOCUMENTS OF U.S.
CONSTITUTIONS 52 (William F. Swindler ed. and annotator 1979). Although Madison was a
delegate to this convention, he was only twenty-five years old at the time; George Mason is
generally given credit as the principal draftsperson. See, e.g., RALPH KETCHAM, JAMES
MADISON: A BIOGRAPHY 68-71 (1971) (noting that "Mason was... widely acknowledged as
having the most profound understanding of republican government of any man in Virginia,"
and that Madison deferred to him).
77. See Gerhard Casper, An Essay in Separation of Powers: Some Early Versions and
Practices, 30 WM. & MARY L. REv. 211, 216-17 (1989) (observing the states' criticism of
separation of powers and their varied policies for implementing separate forms of
government); cf Steven G. Calabresi & Saikrishna B. Prakash, The President's Power to
Execute the Laws, 104 YALE L.J. 541, 607 (1994) (arguing that many original state
constitutions incorporated the separation of powers concept).
78. See GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 1776-1787, at
150-51 (1969) (naming Virginia, Maryland, North Carolina, and Georgia as the four states
that incorporated separate legislative, executive, and judicial branches of government into
their state constitutions).
79. See WILLIAM M. WIECEK, THE GUARANTEE CLAUSE OF THE U.S. CONSTITUTION 21
(1972) (discussing the "merger of the doctrines of separation of powers and mixed
government"); see also MCDONALD, supra note 36, at 86 (noting that "no state endowed its
governor with real power").
80. See MCDONALD, supra note 36, at 86 (summarizing the lack of gubernatorial
powers granted in initial state constitutions); WIECEK, supra note 79, at 21 (noting the
limited executive powers within state governments created in the state constitutions
developed in 1776).
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to even contemplate doing so since the Articles did not so much create a
government as a confederation among thirteen sovereign state
governments. Nevertheless, the Articles contained provisions for
adjudicating certain disputes (disputes between states and questions about
the structure of the confederation itself), and it entrusted this authority to
Congress.
The drafters of the Articles were most afraid of executive tyranny. They
considered King George III and his manipulative advisors to be villains.
But why had the Americans demonized the King and not Parliament? The
revolutionaries argued that much as he corrupted colonial judges by
making them dependent on him for the amount and payment of their
salaries, the King corrupted Parliament through patronage and other
nefarious techniques.8' Parliament might be supreme in theory, but the
monarchy's bribing of members of Parliament reestablished its practical
control.
There is irony here. To move his programs through an often resistant
Parliament, King George III employed a member of the House of Lords,
Lord North, as his "prime minister." North was one of England's first
prime ministers, and the original vision of the job may be thought of, in
modem terms, as the King's lobbyist. English Whigs and the Americans
found this position part of the corruption of Parliament. History has shown
that their concern that the King's employment of a member of Parliament
might undermine the balance of power was correct, but they were right for
the wrong reason. Beginning with the appointment of William Pitt the
Younger-who accepted the post of Prime Minister in 1783 on the
condition that he, rather than the King, select the other ministers-power
flowed not from Parliament to the King but from the King to Parliament.
From the Glorious Revolution to the appointment of William Pitt, the idea
of separation of powers flickered in England, then disappeared. 82
While immediately after the revolution, excessive executive power
served as a primary concern for Americans. Their experience under the
Articles of Confederation changed that view. The state legislatures'
exercise of unchecked power created terrifying results: there was little
regard to the rule of law. Assemblies enacted ex post facto legislation
when it pleased the electorate. Many small farmers, merchants and
81. See GORDON S. WOOD, THE RADICALISM OF.THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 174-75(1992) (highlighting the various methods the King used to corrupt American government);
MCDONALD, supra note 36, at 82-83 (illuminating the King's extensive patronage system
and its corruptive effects on Parliament); see also THORNTON ANDERSON, CREATING THE
CONSTITUTION: THE CONVENTION OF 1787 AND THE FIRST CONGRESS 36-37 (1993) (arguing
that there were religious connotations to the corruption theme).
82. See generally VILE, supra note 47, at 23-82, 107-30 (articulating the ebb and flow
of the separation of powers concept throughout England's history).
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tradesmen-whose incomes and enterprises had suffered when they went
off to war-had amassed large debts. State legislatures issued paper
money and enacted legislation permitting the use of devalued currency to
pay off debts. This form of debtor relief was popular but perilous for a new
nation with a fragile financial system. As Thornton Anderson put it, "[t]he
threat to republican government thus shifted from the man on horseback to
legislative tyranny."
83
The Founders were especially alarmed by what they saw as legislative
irresponsibility in Rhode Island. Alexander Hamilton decried "the
enormities perpetrated by the legislature of Rhode Island., 84  James
Madison believed that if Rhode Island were left to its own devices, without
its alliances with other states tempering its policies, selfish and self-
interested majority will, exercised through the legislature, would become so
tyrannical that the people would wind up revolting against themselves:
It can little be doubted, that if the state of Rhode Island was separated
from the confederacy, and left to itself, the insecurity of rights under the
popular form of government within such narrow limits would be
displayed by such reiterated oppressions of factious majorities, that some
power altogether independent of the people, would soon be called for by
the voice of the very factions whose misrule had proved the necessity of
it.8
5
It was the unchecked power of the American state legislatures that was
the primary impetus for abandoning the Articles of Confederation and
writing the U.S. Constitution. 86 "The legislative department is everywhere
extending the sphere of its activity and drawing power into its impetuous
vortex, '' 87 complained Madison. When, in the summer of 1787, delegates
convened at the Constitutional Convention in Philadelphia under the guise
of revising the Articles of Confederation, there was general agreement that
they needed to go beyond their mandate and create a new government.
Moreover, from the beginning of their deliberations there was consensus
83. ANDERSON, supra note 81, at 168. See also WOOD, supra note 78, at 406-07
(explaining the corruptive effects of debtor relief legislation); RAKOVE, supra note 47, at
291 (suggesting that the new government oppressed the people).
84. THE FEDERALIST No. 7, at 89 (Alexander Hamilton) (J.B. Lippincott & Co. ed.,
1866).
85. THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 402 (James Madison) (J.B. Lippincott & Co. ed., 1866).
86. See, e.g., ANDERSON, supra note 81, at 49 (describing the nationalist movement for
a convention to overrule the Articles of Confederation); WOOD, supra note 78, at 471-75
(stating the belief that the American federal government was too weak under the Articles of
Confederation to have a necessary effect on state governments as needed to establish a
unified nation).
87. THE FEDERALIST No. 48, at 383 (James Madison) (J.B. Lippincott & Co. ed., 1866).
Madison also noted that because the legislature's powers are "more extensive, and less
susceptible of precise limits, it can, with the greater facility, mask, under complicated and
indirect measures, the encroachments which it makes on the co-ordinate departments." Id.
at 384.
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that governmental power should be separated and balanced among the three
branches of government recommended by Montesquieu. 8
C. The Guarantee Clause
When I addressed audiences in Rhode Island about separation of powers,
I generally started with the question, "If someone asked you what the most
fundamental aspects of American democracy 89 were, what would you say?"
After a pause, I suggested that American democracy rests on two pillars.
The first pillar is the principle that the people, through the vote, choose
their representatives in the political branch of government. I suggested the
second is the principle that all power is not placed in one pair of hands but
is divided among separate branches of government, with checks and
balances among them. I would then add that the second pillar is no less
important than the first, for electing a King or a Politburo would be just as
repugnant to our philosophy of government as would not holding elections
at all. This contention powerfully resonated with audiences.
I make this point because I believe that the principle of separation of
powers is at the core of American ideology. Ideology transcends pragmatic
considerations. It reaches deeply into beliefs about political philosophy,
which flow from underlying beliefs about the nature of humankind.90 We
do not bother investigating, for example, whether monarchies are more
effective or, over the course of history, have proven more successful than
democracies.
During the battle for separation of powers in Rhode Island, some argued
that Rhode Island's lack of separation of powers resulted in more
governmental corruption and a weakened economy. It is important here to
draw a distinction between two kinds of corruption. On the one hand, the
88. See ANDERSON, supra note 81, at 50-51 (describing how Edmond Randolph
proposed the three branch system at the beginning of the convention).
89. See WIECEK, supra note 79, at 18 (maintaining the Founders wanted to create a
republican form of government that was neither monarchial nor democratic by stating
"Monarchy represented one extreme in the form of government; its opposite was
'democracy,' which was considered equally undesirable .... Republican government was
thought to be an alternative to these extremes, a middle course between the Scylla of
tyranny and the Charybdis of anarchy.") Nonetheless, I use the term "American
democracy" to refer to our system of government, including its non-democratic elements. I
believe that in common usage the term "American democracy" is both synonymous with
"republican form of government" and better understood. My understanding is that within
popular usage, only the extremist John Birch Society, whose motto at least used to be "This
is a Republic, Not a Democracy; Let's Keep it That Way," draws a distinction between the
two.
90. See 1 LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 127 (3d ed. 2000)
(explaining the separation of powers doctrine "has evolved over the last two hundred years"
and is "a product less of political philosophy than of practical experience"). I agree that
separation of powers doctrine, as a collection of rules, is constructed from practical




term may refer to criminal conduct such as the embezzlement or theft of
public funds (i.e., criminal corruption). On the other, it may be used more
broadly to mean the distortion of public decision-making caused by
conflicts of interest (i.e., legal corruption).
Rhode Island has suffered a stunning amount of criminal corruption. In
recent years, two justices of the state's supreme court, a judge of the
superior court, a speaker of the House, a governor, and the mayor of the
state's largest city left were sent to prison for graft. In another case, a
public leader was, forced from office but not charged criminally. 91 Though
dramatic, these incidents by themselves cannot prove Rhode Island is more
criminally corrupt than other states, and I do not know whether such a thing
has been, or could be, measured.
92
I believe that when people argue that the absence of separation of powers
result in more governmental corruption, they are essentially referring to the
perversion of public decision-making. Without separation of powers, more
decisions-lawful as well as unlawful-are influenced by desires to benefit
private interests at the expense of the general welfare. Both kinds of
corruption result in a waste of public resources. Does Rhode Island suffer
more than its share of what may be called legal corruption? The answer
appears to be yes. According to researchers at Syracuse University, Rhode
Island has one of the least efficient state governments. 93  Another
91. See, e.g., Marcella Bombardieri, Rhode Island Lawmakers Face a Test of Self-
Denial, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 26, 2003, at BI; Scott MacKay, A Gallery of Rogues and
Rascals: Rhode Island's Legend of Political Corruption Lives On, PROVIDENCE J., Sept. 8,
2002, at A-18; Alan Greenblatt, Rhode Island's Recent Dishonor Roll, GOVERNING, Nov.
2001, at 88 (listing the officials in Rhode Island's recent history charged with crimes).
Officials include House Speaker Joseph A. Bevilacqua, who in 1976, engineered his own
election as Chief Justice of the state supreme court; the next Speaker, Matthew J. Smith,
who became a judge on the superior court; the next Chief Justice, Thomas F. Fay; Edward
D. DiPrete, who served as Governor from 1985 to 1991; Vincent A. (Buddy) Cianci, Jr.,
who served as Mayor of Providence in the 1980s conducted illegal activity while in office.
Bevilacqua resigned when facing impeachment for sex scandals and associating with
organized crime members. The others were convicted of felonies in connection with misuse
of office.
92. Corruption in state government is widespread. See, e.g., Laura Mansnerus, Old-
Fashioned Graft, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 30, 2002, at A-I (describing the alleged "culture of
corruption" in New Jersey); see also Ex-Arizona Governor Gets 2 /2 Year Jail Term, CHI.
TRIB., Feb. 3, 1998, at 5 (highlighting the corruption in Arizona state government).
93. See GOVERNMENT PERFORMANCE PROJECT: STATE GRADE REPORT 2001, CAMPBELL
PUB. AFFAIRS INST. (2001) (assessing Rhode Island's performance in five categories of
efficiency and management as a C average, placing it among eleven of the states with the
lowest ratings) available at http://www.maxwell.syr.edu/gpp/grade/state2001/stategrades
2001.asp (last visited Jan. 6, 2004). Rhode Island also received relatively low grades in
taxing performance. See generally Government Performance Project: The Way We Tax:
State Grades at a Glance, Rhode Island, CAMPBELL PUB. AFFAIRS INST. (2003) (last visited
Jan. 6, 2004) (contending Rhode Island's taxing methodology needs improvement)
available at http://governing.com/gpp/2003/gp3ri.htm. See generally Paths to Performance
in State & Local Government: A Final Assessment, CAMPBELL PUBLIC AFFAIRS INSTITUTE
(2002) (last visited Jan. 6, 2004) (describing the method of analysis and surveying tools used
to analyze the progress and placement of the several States in various elements of
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commentator has persuasively argued that Rhode Island has abnormally
bloated public employment rolls, with far too many state workers and
exorbitant salaries.94 He attributes this to a "diseased political culture" in
which public employee unions enjoy enormous political clout.
Whether corruption, legal and illegal, is related to the state's rejection of
separation of powers is a more difficult question. There are reasons to
suspect that corruption may be related to an unusual concentration of power
in Rhode Island government. 95  Though the concentration results
principally from an absence of separation of powers, other factors
exacerbate the situation. While the lack of separation of powers has
concentrated power in the legislature, within the legislature itself power has
become especially concentrated in the House. A Joint Committee on
Legislative Services (JCLS) controls all administrative matters within the
General Assembly, including legislative payrolls, budgets, and allocation of
office space, equipment, and supplies.96 For reasons that seem to remain
something of a mystery, three House members, including the Speaker, but
only two members of the Senate compose the 1960 statutorily established
JCLS.97 This gives a small leadership team in the House, led by the
Speaker, influence over the Senate. As a practical matter, the Senate
cannot hire a staff member nor can a senator obtain a personal computer
without the Speaker's consent.
In addition, the lack of a robust opposition party further enhances the
Speaker's power. Specifically, Republicans control only 14.6 percent of
seats in the House and 16 percent in the Senate. 98
Governmental power is therefore powerfully concentrated in Rhode
Island. There are reasons to at least suspect that this concentration leads to
an increased ease for special interests such as unions to work their will. It
may not be possible to prove this empirically. With a plethora of variables
and only fifty states, I doubt whether either legal or illegal corruption
correlates statistically with particular features of governance such as
separation of powers.
Separation of powers in state governments does not depend on empirical
support however. It is, I believe, constitutionally mandated by the
performance) available at http://www.maxwell.syr.edu/gpp/grade/2002full.pdf.
94. Edward Achom, The Abnormal Ocean State, PROVIDENCE J., Sept. 20, 2003, at B-
05. Achorn is the deputy editorial pages editor of the Providence Journal-Bulletin.
95. See infra Part II, E-F and Part III.
96. See R.I. GEN. LAWS § 22-11-3 (2002) (prescribing the functions of the Joint
Committee on Legislative Services).
97. See R.I. GEN. LAWS § 22-11-1 (2002) (outlining the composition of the Joint
Committee on Legislative Services).
98. See Edward Fitzpatrick, Assembly Outcome Disappoints GOP, PROVIDENCE J., Nov.
7, 2002, at A-09 (articulating a modest, somewhat insignificant, increase in Republican seats
in both the Rhode Island House and Senate).
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Guarantee Clause of the United States Constitution, which states, "The
United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union a Republican
Form of Government .. ."99 Asking whether separation of powers is a
fundamental feature of republican government for purposes of the
Guarantee Clause is, in constitutional terms, much the same thing as asking
whether it is a central part of American ideology. I believe the American
Founders, and Madison and Hamilton specifically, would agree that it is
fundamental.
Earlier thinkers, such as Polybius, Machiavelli, Blackstone, and to a
lesser extent Montesquieu, thought about separation of powers in terms of
"mixed government." Specifically, the contention was that government
included three classes or estates: monarchy, aristocracy, and the people. 00
Each of these classes had different interests and therefore required separate
and distinct representation. The Madisonian revolution adapted this
concept for a purely republican form of government. In the United States,
representatives of different social classes did not comprise government.
All government officials represent the people as a whole.'
01
The Founders view of human nature required the separation of powers in
the American republic. "If angels were to govern men, neither external nor
internal controls on government would be necessary," Madison wrote.
102
"In framing a government which is to be administered by men over men,
the great difficulty lies in this: you must first enable the government to
control the governed; and in the next place oblige it to control itself.'0 3
99. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4.
100. See BERNARD BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION
70-71 (enlarged ed. 1992) (referencing the clichd of the eighteenth century, where
government was comprised of three elements, royalty, nobility, and the commons); see also
WILLS, supra note 7, at ch. 11 and especially 104 (asserting that under mixed government
theory, the action of kingly or aristocratic principles counter republican diseases).
101. Although the Framers hoped that the Senate, with its six-year terms and smaller size
than the House, would become populated by a "better sort" of people who would put the
public interest ahead of parochial interests, they did not intend the Senate to be an analog to
the House of Lords. Senators, as well as members of the House of Representatives, were
expected to represent all of the people and not an aristocracy. See, e.g., MORGAN, supra
note 59, at 248-49, 291-93 (drawing a distinction between Britain's hereditary aristocracy
and the American conception of an aristocracy based on merit); RAKOVE, supra note 47, at
144, 148, 265, 269-70, 272 (discussing how Framers were concerned about designing the
Senate's authority in ways that ensured it not become an aristocratic chamber); see also
WOOD, supra note 81, at 292-93 (describing how the First congress decided that senators
should not receive a higher salary than representatives); cf ANDERSON, supra note 81, at
183-85 (arguing that Framers held "several divergent, even contradictory, conceptions of the
role of the Senate," including the views, among some, that the Senate should be a
"somewhat aristocratic body" and that senators should represent "the separate states as
political entities, as distinguished from the people of the separate states").
102. THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 354 (James Madison) (J.B. Lippincott & Co. ed., 1866).
"[Wihat is government itself but the greatest of all reflections on human nature?" Madison
asked. Id. at 354.
103. Id.
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Madison's solution was that "[a]mbition must be made to counteract
ambition."'' 0 4  For Madison, the structure and nature of republican
government were all but inseparable. It is difficult to believe he would not
have considered one of the most fundamental features of the structure,
aimed at one of the most fundamental concerns, not to be part and parcel of
republican government. Madison continues, "In the extent and proper
structure of the Union, therefore, we behold a republican remedy for the
diseases most incident to republican government." 10 5  Therefore, if
Madison were to have directly addressed whether separation of powers was
an essential feature of republican government, I believe he would have said
that it was.
Hamilton did answer the question directly. He listed four ingredients of
republican government: the "distribution of power into distinct
departments," legislative checks and balances, an independent judiciary
made possible by life tenure of judges, and the selection of members of the
legislature through election by the people.
10 6
What about the Founders generally? In his superb treatise on the
Guarantee Clause, William M. Wiecek of Syracuse University lists five
basic principles that he believes the Founders possibly considered the
Guarantee Clause should embrace: "popular representation; limited
government; the paramountcy of a written constitution and the
subordination of ordinary legislation to it; the separation of powers; and
functional safeguards against the constitution of power."'0 7 In its 1999 and
2000 decisions, the Rhode Island Supreme Court argued that for unique
historical reasons the state never adopted the principle of separation of
powers. 10 8 However, the court avoided the question of whether the people
104. Id. Again, Wills is particularly worth reading on this point. See WILLS, supra note
7, at 124 (contending that Madison's statement on ambition pertains to the ambition
expressed in office, which is a combination of constitutional motive and personal means).
105. THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 70 (James Madison) (J.B. Lippincott & Co. ed., 1866).
106. See THE FEDERALIST No. 9, at 57 (Alexander Hamilton) (J.B. Lippincott & Co. ed.,
1866) (outlining the four essential elements of a republican form of government).
107. WIECEK, supra note 79, at 291. Arguably, the Massachusetts Constitution suggests
separation of powers is essential to a republican form of government when it states that
separation of powers is essential to ensure "a government of laws and not of men." MASS.
CONST. art. XXX.
Two state courts have addressed whether separation of powers is an essential
component of republican govermnent. One held it is. Vansickle v. Shanahan, 511 P.2d 223,
241 (Kan. 1973) (stating that "the doctrine of separation of powers is an inherent and
integral element of the republican form of government"). The other held it is not, but at the
same time declared: "[T]he separation of powers concept is extremely important, and
fundamental to our free system of government. We are unalterably opposed to any attempt
by one branch of the government to assume the power of another." In re Interrogatories
Propounded by the Senate Concerning House Bill 1078, 536 P.2d 308, 316 (Colo. 1975).
108. This was hardly necessary. The stronger argument was that the Rhode Island
Constitution embraced the principle of separation of powers when, in 1842, the new state
constitution expressly provided: "The powers of the government shall be distributed into
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of Rhode Island adopted the principle when they ratified the United States
Constitution. Could Rhode Island citizens reasonably have intended to join
the Union, accept the U.S. Constitution and all of its requirements, and still
have expected to have their state governed, without any theoretical change,
by a charter granted by an English king? Surely these citizens expected
that in ratifying the Constitution they swept away any aspects of their prior
government that were incompatible with fundamental tenets of American
republican democracy.'0 9
Moreover, the state supreme court could have found that the Rhode
Island government was required to conform to the principle by the
Guarantee Clause regardless of whether the people so intended when they
ratified the Constitution. As with all constitutionally guaranteed rights, as
long as a single Rhode Island citizen wants a republican system of
government, she is entitled to have it.
Even if the Guarantee Clause is not justiciable in the federal courts,' 0
the Rhode Island courts could hold that the Clause is enforceable in the
state's courts. Indeed, in a 1992 advisory opinion, all five justices of the
Rhode Island Supreme Court expressed exactly that view. 1' Moreover, the
Rhode Island Constitution requires the justices to support both the state and
federal constitutions. 1 2 Therefore, the Rhode Island Supreme Court not
only might have, but arguably was obliged to, interpret the Guarantee
Clause and strike down any aspect of state government inconsistent with a
republican form of government. This would not have required
reconfiguring state government. The three traditional branches have
three departments: the legislative, executive, and judicial." R.I. CONST. art. V. For an
expanded argument, see Carl T. Bogus, Rhode Island Faces a Political Crisis, PROVIDENCE
J., Aug. 15, 2000, at B-04 (maintaining there is little check on legislative power in Rhode
Island). See generally Carl T. Bogus, A Radical Decision by the RI. Supreme Court, R.I.
BAR J., Nov. 1999, at 13 (arguing the Rhode Island Supreme Court used an incorrect method
of analysis in its interpretation of separation of powers within the state).
109. In 1842, political reformer William Goodell made exactly this argument See, e.g.,
WIECEK, supra note 79, at 90 (highlighting William Goodell's opinion in 1842 that adoption
of the guarantee clause negated the effect prior charters).
110. This is a question I do not take up here, other than to note that I do not consider the
answer to be clear. Ever since Luther v. Borden, the conventional wisdom has been that the
Clause is not justiciable in the federal courts. However, the Court was then contemplating a
case in which armed conflict had been a real prospect, and in such circumstances only the
political branches can act quickly enough. But in different circumstances there may be
strong reasons why the courts should decide whether a particular practice violates the
Guarantee Clause. See generally Michael C. Dorf, The Relevance of Federal Norms for
State Separation of Powers, 4 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 51, 59-67 (1998) (clarifying the
justiciability of the Guaranty Clause in state courts).
111. See In re Advisory Opinion to the Governor, 612 A.2d 1, 15-17 (R.I. 1992) (holding
that the Guaranty Clause applies to the state and analyzing a constitutional amendment for
potential violation of the federal Guaranty Clause and reasoning it did not).
112. See R.I. CONST. art. III, § 4 (binding all political and judicial officers to both the
state and the U.S. Constitutions).
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always comprised the Rhode Island government,"13 and the Rhode Island
Supreme Court should have had no trouble finding separation of powers
implied in the state constitution's Distribution of Powers clause. After all,
the United States Supreme Court found the doctrine implied in the United
States Constitution even though that document lacks a Distribution of
Powers Clause."
14
D. Is Separation of Powers a Conservative Issue?
Some believe liberals and conservatives see separation of powers
differently. Conservatives, many argue, accept the darker portrait of
human nature painted by Thomas Hobbes and Edmund Burke, one that
emphasizes an inherent selfishness.'15 Conservatives favor separation of
powers because they see a need to check self-interest in government
officials; as Madison put it, the need for ambition to check ambition. Like
Lord Acton, they are worried about the poisoning of power itself. Both
George H. Nash, author of one of the definitive intellectual histories of
conservatism, and Thomas Sowell, author of the one definitive exegesis of
the underlying visions of conservative and liberal thought, stress the
importance of separation of powers to conservatives." 6 Liberals, however,
lean toward John Locke and Jean-Jacques Rousseau's more sunny view of
human nature. They believe that unless perverted by cruelty or injustice,
human nature is innately good. Therefore, the argument runs, liberals are
less concerned with separation of powers. In fact, some even consider it an
unnecessary obstacle stymieing dynamic government." 
7
These are not views I share. Liberal and conservative views on human
nature are too varied, rich, and complex to be captured in any single,
113. At least insofar as Rhode Island had a governor, legislature, and courts. See
PATRICK T. CONLEY, DEMOCRACY IN DECLINE: RHODE ISLAND'S CONSTITUTIONAL
DEVELOPMENT 1176-1841, at 40-41 (1977) (noting Rhode Island had governor, general
assembly, and courts in the seventeenth century).
114. See Nat'l Mut. Ins. Co. v. Tidewater Transfer Co., 337 U.S. 582, 590-91 (1949)
(reasoning "the doctrine of separation of powers is fundamental to our system. It arises,
however, not from Art. III nor any other single provision of the Constitution, but because
'behind the words of the constitutional provisions are postulates which limit and control."'
(quoting Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313, 323 (1934)).
115. See generally THOMAS SOWELL, A CONFLICT OF VISIONS: IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF
POLITICAL STRUGGLES (1987) (elaborating upon the description of the theory that liberal and
conservative beliefs are rooted in different visions of human nature). See also STEVEN
PINKER, THE BLANK SLATE: THE MODERN DENIAL OF HUMAN NATURE 287-95 (2002)
(summarizing Sowell's position on the connection of political beliefs to human nature).
116. GEORGE H. NASH, THE CONSERVATIVE INTELLECTUAL MOVEMENT IN AMERICA
SINCE 1945, at 168, 191, 202-03, 208, 233, 293 (1976); SOWELL, supra note 115, at 25.
117. See generally GARRY WILLS, A NECESSARY EVIL: A HISTORY OF AMERICAN
DISTRUST OF GOVERNMENT 15-22, 83-90 (1999) (finding that over time, liberals have often




simple theory.' 18 No thoughtful person sees the human being in cartoon
terms. Liberals may have greater faith in the capacity of loving parents,
nurturing teachers, and caring communities to produce psychologically
whole and healthy adults. Yet liberals are especially aware that most
people are not raised under ideal conditions. Liberals are more ready than
conservatives to acknowledge the terrible secrets of child abuse and sexual
molestation. Liberals are the first to defend social services and educational
programs for underprivileged children, such as Head Start, and warn of the
dire social consequences of abandoning them. And liberals are at least as
concerned about the pernicious effects of the materialistic culture on child
development. While liberals may, therefore, have a greater faith in people
growing straight and whole in nurturing environments, they see a wide gap
between present reality and the ideal." 9 Liberals may be particularly
concerned that people who choose a career in elective politics do so
because of unhealthy psychological flaws. For liberals and conservatives
alike, government officials in the real world are not philosopher-kings.
Conservatives are great believers in economic laissez-faire but liberals
believe passionately in the marketplace of public discussion. Liberals
believe in a sort of Gresham's Law of ideas-when there is open and
vigorous debate, good ideas will, over time, prevail over bad ideas.
120
Thus, liberals see separation of powers as a mechanism for forcing
government officials in one branch to persuade officials in the other
branches, through reasoned articulation, of the wisdom of policies.
Legislators, for example, must persuade the governor that laws are sensible
to avoid vetoes. Political branches must persuade the courts that policies
are not arbitrary or capricious. Therefore, while conservatives may see
separation of powers as a safeguard against selfishness and liberals may see
it as a check on improvident decisions, both believe it is important.
And in fact, liberals and conservatives do not line up neatly with respect
to their views on either human nature or separation of powers. We are told
that conservatives support separation of powers because they share
Hobbes' pessimistic view of human nature. However, Hobbes himself.was
118. Although Sowell has persuaded me that his theory has merit, I do not believe it is a
complete or perfect account of the liberal-conservative dichotomy. I wonder if Sowell's
contention that liberal and conservative visions have remained consistent over centuries has
diminishing power, because those visions are now undergoing change. I find at least as
compelling George Lakoff's theory that the liberal-conservative divide is defined by
different visions of the family, with conservatives and liberals attempting, respectively, to
model government after a family dominated by either a strong father or a nurturing mother.
See generally GEORGE LAKOFF, MORAL POLITICS: WHAT CONSERVATIVES KNOW THAT
LIBERALS DON'T (1996).
119. Liberals believe there is a large gap between the actual and potential capabilities of
ordinary people, See SOWELL, supra note 115, at 148, 153 (agreeing that liberals believe
there is a large gap between the actual and potential capabilities of ordinary people).
120. See generally id. at 35-65 (arguing that liberals have a greater faith in rationality).
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not a believer in separation of powers. 21 Neither was Willmoore Kendall,
one of the leaders of the modem conservative intellectual movement. 122
Lord Acton was a liberal. 123 Furthermore, both liberals and conservatives
claim James Madison as one of their own.' 24 And there is an emerging
Darwinian Left that recognizes that self-interest is an evolved part of the
human personality. 1
25
Finally, the Rhode Island experience does not bear out a liberal-
conservative divide over separation of powers. Sheldon Whitehouse, a
former Democratic attorney general and gubernatorial candidate, was the
original proponent of the issue. Republican Governor Lincoln Almond
crusaded for separation of powers by pursuing the issue before the state
supreme court. Unsuccessful there, he placed two non-binding referenda
on the ballot, asking voters whether they wanted the state constitution
amended to provide for separation of power. Rhode Island voters answered
in the affirmative both times, with 66 percent voting yes in 2000, and 76
percent voting yes in 2002.126 The issue received overwhelming majorities
in every election district. All five of the 2002 gubernatorial candidates,
two Republicans and three Democrats, supported separation of powers.
The newly elected Republican Governor, Donald Carcieri, made it the
flagship proposal in his Inaugural Address. And in my own experience in
the state, I observed no significant difference between those supporting
separation of powers based either on party affiliation or ideology. Across
the spectrum, people overwhelmingly accepted separation of powers as a
fundamental part of the American form of government.
II. SEPARATION OF POWERS AND RHODE ISLAND HISTORY
A. The Charter of 1663
Unlike her sister states, Rhode Island did not adopt a constitution during
or immediately after the Revolutionary War but continued to operate under
a charter granted by King Charles II of England in 1663. This charter
121. See HOBBES, supra note 44 and accompanying text (arguing the separation of
powers can have disastrous consequences).
122. See NASH, supra note 116, at 224 (expressing Willmoore Kendall's thoughts on
separation of powers).
123. See id. at 250 (contending that even liberal Lord Acton's views effected
conservative opinion in matters dealing with political power).
124. See, e.g., WILLS, supra note 117 (lamenting the misappropriation of Madison's
silhouette by the conservative Federalist Society, which uses it as its symbol).
125. See generally PETER SINGER, A DARWINIAN LEFT: POLITICS, EVOLUTION AND
COOPERATION (1999) (arguing that self-interest is an inherent and ever-evolving trait).
126. See Liz Anderson, Why the Struggle for Separation of Powers, PROVIDENCE J., Jan.
26, 2003, at D-01 (claiming that most voters supported referendums on separation of
powers).
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established what was then considered the most liberal of democracies.1 27
However, it was granted thirty-five years before Locke's Two Treatises of
Government and eighty-eight years before Montesquieu's The Spirit of the
Laws, and placed all power, including the legislative, executive, and
judicial, in the colonial legislature. When in the Federalist Papers
Madison reviewed how the states had incorporated the principle of
separation of powers into their constitutions, he passed over Rhode Island
because it was "formed prior to the Revolution and even before the
principle [of separation of powers] had become an object of political
attention. '' 12  But Madison probably harbored no illusions about Rhode
Island soon reforming its government. Madison had long been exasperated
by Rhode Island's intransigence.' 29 Although twelve of the thirteen states
agreed that Articles of Confederation needed to be revised, "the petty state
of Rhode Island,"'' 30 as Madison described it, "has obstructed every attempt
to reform the government" and "repeatedly disobeyed and counteracted
general authority."'
131
B. The Dorr Rebellion
In fact, Rhode Island did not reform its government.' 32 The landowners,
who controlled the General Assembly because only they and their first-
born sons were allowed to vote, preferred not to yield power. Owning land
had always been a qualification for voting, but whether this was a liberal or
restrictive qualification changed from time to time and place to place. In
the seventeenth century, Roger Williams' settlement in Providence tried to
distribute land equally among all settlers while the Portsmouth settlement
allocated land in proportion to one's wealth and social standing, allowing
only a minority to vote.133 From 1723, the value of real estate that one had
to own in order to qualify to vote was set by statute and was uniform across
the state. 134 At first, this was considered a liberal reform, as voting rights
127. See WILLIAM G. McLOUGHLIN, RHODE ISLAND: A BICENTENNIAL HISTORY 38-39
(1978) (describing Rhode Island's uniquely liberal and progressive charter).
128. THE FEDERALIST No. 47, at 334 (James Madison) (J.B. Lippincott & Co. ed., 1866).
129. See JAMES MADISON, Speech in the Virginia Ratifying Convention in Defense of the
Constitution, in MADISON, WRITINGS 354, 356-57 (Jack N. Rakove ed., 1999) (making
disparaging remarks about Rhode Island).
130. Id. at 357.
131. ld. at356.
132. Nor did Rhode Island send delegates to the constitutional convention in
Philadelphia or ratify the United States Constitution and join the Union until May 1790,
after the other twelve states had joined and Providence and Newport threatened to secede
from the state and join the Union on their own. See McLOUGHLIN, supra note 127, at 104;
RAKOVE, supra note 47, at 246 (1996).
133. See McLOUGHUN, supra note 127, at 21.
134. See CONLEY, supra note 113, at 48-49 (detailing how a freeman's land value, in
order to vote, was originally set at 100 pounds, but fluctuated as a result of inflation and
deflation trends).
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were conferred broadly. Historians estimate that in 1723, 75 percent of the
adult, white, male population owned enough land to qualify to vote. 135 But
as time marched on and the cities grew, an ever smaller portion of the
population was qualified to vote. By 1840, the situation had become
patently undemocratic. 136 Putting aside the issue that neither blacks nor
women could vote, fully two-thirds of the adult, white, male population
were disqualified from voting. Moreover, apportionment of seats in the
General Assembly had been fixed 177 years earlier, and there was no
mechanism for change.' 37 Providence, with a population of 23,000, held
only four seats in the General Assembly while Newport, with only 9,000
people, held six seats. 138 In fact, a number of small towns enjoyed greater
representation than the large cities. And that was just how the General
Assembly-and the landowners who controlled it-wanted to keep it.'
39
Under the leadership of a lawyer named Thomas Wilson Dorr, a group of
reformers organized a constitutional convention. 40 They permitted every
adult, white male in the state to vote in an election for delegates.' 41 The
convention ultimately met and produced the "People's Constitution.'
' 42
The People's Constitution clearly provided for separation of powers.
"No person or persons connected with one of [the three branches of
government] shall exercise any of the powers belonging to either of the
The right to vote was compromised by property qualifications and apportionment
problems for far too long in Rhode Island. As means of retaining Yankee control despite
the influx of immigrants, naturalized citizens were required to own land to qualify to vote
until this was abolished by the Bourn Amendment in 1888. See McLOUGHLIN, supra note
127, at 160-61. There continued to be landowning requirements to vote in municipal
elections until 1928, when Democrats finally achieved sufficient strength to abolish this
practice by constitutional amendment. Until 1973, only persons who paid some form of
taxes, whether on real estate or personal property, could vote. Id. at 193.
The Dorr Rebellion failed to end severe apportionment inequities. Rural counties
continued to have disproportionately greater representation in the General Assembly. For
example, in 1905, although 40 percent of the state's population lived in Providence, that 40
percent could elect only 16.75 percent of the members of the General Assembly. Id. at 163.
The apportionment problems continued until the United States Supreme Court famous
voting rights cases in the mid-1960's. Id. at 215.
135. See CONLEY, supra note 113, at 49; see also MARvrN E. GETTLEMAN, THE DORR
REBELLION, A STUDY IN AMERICAN RADICALISM: 1833-1849 6-7 (1973) (quoting David
Lovejoy and other historians who had similar estimates) (footnote omitted).
136. For the history of the Dorr Rebellion, I rely on CONLEY, supra note 113, at 309-79;
GETTLEMAN, supra note 135; and McLOUGHLIN, supra note 127, at 126-37.
137. See GETTLEMAN, supra note 135, at 4 (describing the Charter of 1663 and how the
Charter declared the number of representatives for each town).
138. See id.
139. See id. at 4, 6 (clarifying how the political power of the General Assembly was
chosen by freemen, defined in terms of property ownership).
140. See id. at 43 (confirming that Dorr was invited to stand for election for the People's
Constitutional Convention).
141. See id. at 43, 45 (footnote omitted) (verifying that male adult citizens residing in the
state for at least one year could vote in the election).
142. See GETTLEMAN, supra note 135, at 44-45 (footnote omitted) (establishing when the
People's Constitution first appeared in draft form).
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others, except in cases herein.., permitted," one section read. 143 Another
section gave the governor the power to appoint all government officers,
except those otherwise provided for.44
The reformers held another election-a gain, open to all male, white
citizens-in which the People's Constitution was approved by a vote of
13,947 to 52.' 4' The small number of people voting in opposition is not
significant since the landowners, not wanting to lend legitimacy to the
election, stayed away from the polls. However, Dorr and his followers
argued that 13,947 constituted a majority of all eligible voters in the state,
declared the constitution ratified, and held elections to fill positions in the
new government.
The established power structure used every means at its disposal to crush
this new government. The state supreme court (controlled by the
legislature) ruled that the People's Constitution was invalid. 46  The
General Assembly declared martial law and enacted legislation making acts
against the established government treason. The Governor issued a warrant
for Doff's arrest. 147 Some of Dorr's followers were arrested, brutalized,
and terrorized (one was even subjected to the grisly ordeal of being put
through a mock execution). 48
At the same time, the landowners sought to placate the populace by
offering to replace King Charles's charter with a new constitution that
contained minimal reforms. The landowners' first effort was defeated at
the polls, but a second document, often called the Algerine Constitution,
was approved by a vote of 7,024 to 51. Again, the number in opposition is
misleading; this time Dorr's supporters did not vote. What is significant is
that only 25 percent of the electorate-half the number of people who had
voted for the People's Constitution-voted for the Algerine Constitution.1
49
Nevertheless, the landowners declared their constitution had been ratified.
Dorr's supporters asked the United States Supreme Court to declare
theirs to be the lawful government of Rhode Island, but in the famous case
143. PEOPLE'S CONST. art. III, § 2, in GETTLEMAN, supra note 135, at app. A.
144. See id. art. VIII, § 5, in GETTLEMAN, supra note 135.
145. See GETTLEMAN, supra note 135, at 54 (distinguishing the errors in the amount of
votes for endorsing the People's Constitution (footnote omitted)). See also CONLEY, supra
note 113, at 315 (showing 13,944 votes for the People's Constitution).
146. See CONLEY, supra note 113, at 317-18 (asserting how attempting to carry the
People's Constitution into effect would be treason).
147. See id. at 334-35, 337, 341 (characterizing how Governor King and Sheriff Potter
tried several times to arrest Dorr with a warrant).
148. See id. at 349-50 (suggesting those seized were subjected to harsh treatments and
denial of civil rights).
149. See GETrLEMAN, supra note 135, at 147 (examining the voter turnout for the
Algerine Constitution). A strong but unnerving argument can be made that the Rhode
Island Constitution was never legitimately ratified. See Gorham v. Robinson, 186 A. 832,
840 (R.I. 1936) (claiming that the Convention of 1834 dissolved without proposing a
Constitution).
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of Luther v. Borden150 the Court held this was a question entrusted to the
President and Congress rather than the federal courts, and it declined to
intervene. Faced with the choice of accepting the Algerine Constitution or
resorting to armed warfare, Dorr and his supporters decided against
bloodshed.
It is the Algerine Constitution that, in the main, survives to this very day.
That document was-probably deliberately-vague on the question of
separation of powers. The landowners wanted to make the document
attractive enough to be accepted while preserving as much legislative
power as possible. They started a devilish precedent of drafting a
document that appeared to contain the demanded reform, but seeding it
with an ambiguity that might later be read as withholding all or part of that
very reform.
Thus, on the one hand, the Rhode Island Constitution includes a
provision stating, "The powers of the government shall be distributed into
three departments: the legislative, executive, and judicial,"' 51 as well as a
provision vesting the "chief executive power of this state" in the
governor. 152 On the other hand, it has a clause providing, "The general
assembly shall continue to exercise the powers it has heretofore exercised,
unless prohibited by this Constitution."' 53 It is that phrase, as we shall see,
that the General Assembly continued to use to trace its powers back to
those granted to it by King Charles II in 1663 and to claim that it is a
transcendent branch of government.
C. Early Twentieth Century
In 1901, the General Assembly passed the Brayton Act, which
effectively gave the legislature the power of appointment over not only
judicial appointments but executive appointments as well, thereby reducing
the governor to the mere figurehead of the executive branch.154 Historians
generally emphasize the political context in which this occurred; the
legislation was a mechanism by which the Republican-controlled General
Assembly sought to weaken Democratic Governors.155 However, it was a
flagrant violation of separation of powers, and it lasted for thirty-four years.
When, in 1935, Governor Theodore Francis Green and the Democrats in
Rhode Island rode to power on Franklin D. Roosevelt's coattails as loyal
150. 48 U.S. 1 (1849).
151. R.I. CONST. art. V.
152. Id. art. IX, § 1.
153. Id. art. VI, § 10.
154. See McLOUGHLIN, supra note 127, at 162.
155. See id.; see also CONLEY, supra note 113, at 376 (indicating the General Assembly
not only had a "legislative veto[,] but.., over state appointments and the state budget" as
well).
2004]
ADMINISTRATIVE LA W REVIEW
supporters of the New Deal-controlling, for the first time since the
election of Abraham Lincoln, the executive branch and both houses of the
General Assembly-they repealed the infamous Brayton Act. But they too
sacrificed separation of powers to the politics of the moment. On New
Year's Day 1935, the first official day of the new legislative session, the
newly elected General Assembly declared each of the five seats on the
Rhode Island Supreme Court to be vacant-thus purporting to fire all of the
sitting members of the court-and elected replacements.' 56 The objective
was to clear the court of Republican appointees who might find New Deal
programs to be unconstitutional.1 57  To soften public outrage, Green
persuaded his Democratic cohorts in the General Assembly to allow him to
appoint two Republicans to the court, and proceeded to cleverly provide
ethnic diversity by appointing two Yankees, two Irish-Americans, and an
Italian-American. 
158
The legislature relied on a section of the state constitution that provided
that members of the supreme court "shall hold office until that judge's
place be declared vacant by a resolution of the general assembly" but also
specified that "[s]uch resolution shall not be entertained at any other time
than the annual session for the election of public officers."' 59 In another
case fifty-one years later, the Rhode Island Supreme Court would, in effect,
declare that the removal of the justices had been unconstitutional.160
However, in 1935 the justices agreed not to challenge their termination in
return for the General Assembly's granting them life pensions.' 61
Around the same time, the General Assembly also replaced lower court
judges. Four of these judges challenged the legislature's authority to
remove them without cause. 162 In 1936, their case was heard by the newly
appointed justices of the Rhode Island Supreme Court. In a 3-2 decision,
the court upheld the power of the General Assembly to remove judges at its
156. See In re Advisory Opinion No. 85-471-M.P., 507 A.2d 1316, 1323, 1331 (majority
and dissenting opinions, respectively) (1986) (stating that the General Assembly used its
power to remove justices of the Rhode Island Supreme Court).
157. See McLOUGHLIN, supra note 127, at 202.
158. See id. Members of the state supreme court were then called "judges" but their title
has since been changed to "justices." I use the modem term for the sake of clarity.
159. See id. at 201-02.
160. The court reviewed the historical reasons for the "annual session for the election of
public officers," and found that the 1893 amendments to the state constitution rendered
obsolete the annual session for the election of officers and the General Assembly's ability to
declare supreme court vacancies on that day alone had been "consigned to history." In re
Advisory Opinion, supra note 156, at 1322.
161. See id. at 1323 (conceding that the court never had to address when the Legislature
tried to resurrect the power to vacate justices before because those justices agreed not to
challenge the termination if they received life pensions).
162. See Gorham v. Robinson, 186 A. 832, 836 (R.I. 1936) (claiming that the General
Assembly's act was invalid because they are powerless under the Rhode Island Constitution
to remove the justices (and clerks) unless by impeachment).
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pleasure. 163 Writing for the majority, Justice Moss said:
We have examined the materials which the petitioners have furnished to
us as supporting their contention, and have found nothing in these which
tends to bring into question the power of the General Assembly, before
our Constitution went into effect, to remove any judge from office at any
time at its pleasure. This court has repeatedly recognized the fact that
under the charter, which constituted the fundamental law of the this state
prior to 1843, the General Assembly was virtually supreme in the
government, except so far as limited under the Constitution of the United
States. 64
The court found "a long and unbroken record of the exercise by the
General Assembly of every kind of governmental power, legislative,
executive, and judicial.' 65  The court made much of the fact that the
General Assembly retained "all the powers it had formerly exercised.', 166
"[A]s to the principles of the separation of powers," the court could simply
not find that "they were given much recognition."'' 67 The court went on,
with comical inconsistency, to puff up the constitutional language stating
that "the legislative power is vested in the General Assembly" while
deflating the parallel language that "[t]he chief executive power of the state
shall be vested in a governor," draining it of virtually any meaning.' 68 The
constitution simply gives the governor "expressly very little executive
power," it declared.1
69
In dissent, Justice Capotosto wrote:
Counsel for the respondents [formally, the newly appointed judges], as
well as the Attorney General, in their briefs and arguments, stress the
"omnipotency" of the General Assembly. The use of this word, in its
broad sense and without qualification, to mean that the legislative
department has unlimited power, is unwarranted and in direct conflict
with the very fundamentals of American constitutional government. If
the General Assembly has any such power, then the Constitution is a
mere pretense, and the Legislature might well say, as did Louis XIV of
France: "I am the State."'
' 70
Justice Capotosto stressed the importance of the Guarantee Clause of the
United States Constitution, which, he suggested, required that "the powers
of the government [be] distributed among three departments that are
163. See id. at 860 (finding that the General Assembly has, since 1853, asserted control
over the terms of office of the justices of the courts).
164. Id. at 839 (citation omitted).
165. Id. (citation omitted).
166. Id. at 841.
167. Id.
168. Gorham, 186 A. at 841-42.
169. Id. at 841.
170. Id. at 864.
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intended to be independent within their respective spheres."1 71 "It is too
late to try to read into [the state constitution] now, almost 100 years after its
adoption, an inference that the people of this state intended to give the
General Assembly practically unlimited control over a co-ordinate branch
of the government which they created for the protection of person and
property."
' 172
There can, of course, be no genuine judicial independence or any
assurance of a rule of law when the political branches of government can
replace judges at their will. 73 Nevertheless, the General Assembly retained
the ability to do so until either 1986, when, in an advisory opinion, the
court held that the General Assembly lacked that authority, or 1994, when
at the same time the constitution was amended to provide for merit
selection of judges the General Assembly's authority to declare supreme
court seats vacant was eliminated, and another section was added providing
that justices would "hold office during good behavior."' 17 4
D. Executive Power
In the main, the head of an executive branch in American government-
whether the President or a Governor-has three, and in some states up to
five, potential sources of power. First, all chief executives have the bully
pulpit. 75 Generally, by virtue of their position alone, they can command
press attention and thereby reach the public-at-large. 76 The magnitude of
the pulpit power, of course, depends on the personality, savvy, and
communication skills of the individual. For a "great communicator" the
bully pulpit is more powerful than for others; and even for a single
individual, pulpit power fluctuates with the vicissitudes of his or her
popularity at the moment. Nevertheless, all executives have a bully pulpit.
The second source of executive power is the veto. Not only does this
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. At least since 1856, the state supreme court has recognized and sought to safeguard
judicial independence. In that year, a party who believed itself to be erroneously subject to
a garnishment order issued by the court of common pleas of Providence county sought relief
not from the court but from the General Assembly, which set aside the court's order.
Relying on seven provisions in the state constitution, including the distribution of powers
clause, as well as what I call fundamental American ideology, with citations to Montesquieu
and Madison's writings, the Rhode Island Supreme Court had little difficulty finding that
the state constitution incorporated the principles of separation of powers and an independent
judiciary, and holding that notwithstanding whatever it had done historically, the General
Assembly was constitutionally prohibited from interfering with court orders. G. & D.
Taylor & Co. v. R. G. Place, 4 R.I. 324, 360 (1856).
174. R.I. CONST. art. X, § 5.
175. See ALAN ROSENTHAL, THE DECLINE OF REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACY 301 (1998)
(implying that governors are automatically offered a "bully pulpit" from the media).
176. See id. at 300 (contending that the individual governor can capitalize on the media
better than a group of legislators).
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give a President or Governor power to block legislation with which he or
she disagrees unless the legislature can muster a supermajority, but
strategic use of (or even the threat of) the veto gives him or her the ability
to negotiate changes in legislation. This allows the executive to become an
influential player in shaping legislation. The strength of an executive's
veto may vary with two key factors. Governors with a line-item veto have
an especially potent tool because they can eliminate specific initiatives,
either by vetoing the enabling legislation or by vetoing their appropriations.
In states without a line-item veto, the legislature can often maneuver the
Governor into accepting measures he or she opposes by including them in
bills that he or she cannot afford to veto in total. The strength of veto
power also varies with the strength of the Governor's political party. It is a
relatively weak tool in the hands of a Governor whose party does not
control enough seats in the legislature to override vetoes.
Third, some chief executives have a role in selecting judges. The
President, for example, selects judges for all three levels of the federal
courts. 177 The power is not absolute; his nomination must be confirmed by
the Senate. 178 Nevertheless, the power to nominate judges is enormously
influential, especially in systems where judges have life tenure.
Fourth, some chief executives have the authority to appoint the
government's chief law enforcement official, generally the attorney
general. While political interference with an attorney general's
performance would be considered illegitimate, chief executives who select,
and have the power to remove, the government's chief law enforcement
official nonetheless influence how the laws will be enforced.
Fifth, and arguably most important of all, is the ability to appoint
officials in the executive branch, especially of the regulatory agencies.
This gives the chief executives discretion in terms of deciding how the laws
will be implemented, including which laws will be enforced aggressively
and which less so. A chief executive who, for example, favors strong
environmental protection can appoint an administrator who will vigorously
enforce the environmental laws; by contrast, one who gives a higher
priority to business development can appoint an administrator who will
focus on business initiatives.
For Rhode Island governors, the veto is a relatively weak tool. First,
Rhode Island is one of only seven states that does not give the Governor
the power to veto individual items in appropriation bills. 79 Second, Rhode
Island is effectively a one-party state, at least in the General Assembly.
177. See U.S. CoNsT. art. 11, § 2, cl. 2.
178. See id.
179. See ROSENTHAL, supra note 175, at 296 (explaining that forty-three states have the
power to veto individual items in appropriation bills, Rhode Island not being one of them).
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The Democratic Party controls approximately 85 percent of the seats in
both chambers, and legislative leaders have little trouble mustering super-
majorities on legislation to which they give high priority. 180
Rhode Island governors have a relatively weak role in selecting judges
(more about that later),' 81 and the state's attorney general is independently
elected. To make matters worse, Rhode Island has a divided executive.
While the Governor is the chief executive officer of the state, three other
executive officers-the Lieutenant Governor, Secretary of State, and
Attorney General-are independently elected. Moreover, the Governor
and Lieutenant Governor do not run as a team, and so the two are not
necessarily political allies. 1
82
In modem American government, both at the federal and state level, one
of the chief executive's most important sources of power is her ability to
control the governmental departments and agencies by appointing the
controlling officers who serve at the Governor's pleasure. In Rhode Island,
however, this power is especially critical-for without it, the Governor's
quiver is nearly empty. It is to this topic we turn next.
E. The Administrative State in Rhode Island
1. Background
The origins of regulatory agencies are generally traced to 1887, the year
that both Congress established the Interstate Commerce Commission
(ICC), which is generally considered the first modern agency, and a young
professor at Bryn Mawr College named Woodrow Wilson published an
essay titled "The Study of Administration."' 83 At first, the administrative
state grew slowly. The second independent agency, the Federal Trade
Commission (FTC), was not formed until 1914.184 The New Deal provided
the first burst of agency creation, with the establishment of the Securities
and Exchange Commission (SEC) and the National Labor Relations Board
(NLRB), among others; and an even greater expansion came during the
180. See, e.g., id. at 318 (analyzing how in Rhode Island in 1996, the legislature passed
its own budget because of the governor's refusal to negotiate); see also Katherine Gregg &
Liz Anderson, State Budget Veto Falls, PROVIDENCE J., July 16, 2003, at A-01 (describing
the ease with which the Rhode Island General Assembly overrode vetoes of their budgets by
the last two Governors).
181. See infra notes 231-34 and accompanying text.
182. The Rhode Island Lieutenant Governor has no significant responsibilities or
authority. In the 2002 election, the candidate of the Cool Moose Party promised to serve
without pay, terminate the staff, and recommend that the office be abolished. His campaign
slogan was: "Martin Healy: He's Good for Nothing." See Rossano: No Longer a Moose,
But Still Cool, PROVIDENCE J., Aug. 20, 2002, at C-01.
183. JERRY L. MASHAW ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: THE AMERICAN PUBLIC LAW
SYSTEM 4 (3d ed. 1992).
184. See id at 5-6.
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1960s and 1970s.
Today, of course, much of modem government is operated by regulatory
agencies. One directory lists what it designates as twelve "major"1
regulatory agencies, most of which are instantly recognizable by initials,
such as EPA, FCC, FTC, FDA, NLRB, OSHA, and SEC; sixteen "other"
agencies, including the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC); and
seventy-six "departmental agencies" located within cabinet level
departments, including for example the Federal Aviation Administration
(FAA) and National Highway Transportation and Safety Administration
(NHTSA), both of which are within the Department of Transportation. 85
This particular directory is devoted only to agencies that regulate the
private sector and omits agencies such as the Tennessee Valley Authority
(TVA) that provide services themselves but do not regulate others. Of
course, some governmental agencies, such as the Coast Guard and IRS,
both perform functions themselves and regulate particular spheres of
activity. It is on the basis of their regulatory functions that this directory
classifies agencies as "major" or "other;" thus, it is not by virtue of its size
that it fails to list the U.S. Postal Service as a "major" agency. 86 Although
separation of powers questions relate to both kinds of agencies, regulatory
agencies present special problems because they involve mixtures of
executive, legislative, and judicial functions.
During the course of the twentieth century, the administrative state
developed in the states as well, including Rhode Island. But in Rhode
Island, agencies did not merely develop, they metastasized. According to
one study, Rhode Island has 429 agencies, boards, and commissions,
seventy-three of which are performing executive functions.18 7 Depending
on how one counts, this may mean that Rhode Island has more
administrative agencies than does the federal government.1
88
The Rhode Island administrative state has undergone unusual and, I
believe, unhealthy growth as a direct result of the state's rejection of the
principle of separation of powers. One of the most significant modem
developments in the evolution of American government has been the
process of fitting the growth of the administrative state into the structure of
separation of powers envisioned by the Founders. In the main, the United
185. FEDERAL REGULATORY DIRECTORY v-vii (10th ed., 2001).
186. See id. (indicating that the U.S. Postal Service is under "other regulatory agencies"
even though it is such a large agency).
187. COMMON CAUSE OF R.I., SEPARATION OF POWERS REFERENCE MANUAL (June 23,
2003) (on file with author).
188. I use the term "agency" to refer to all independent bodies not within a governmental
department, including entities called boards and commissions. Rhode Island's seventy-three




States Supreme Court has accomplished this by giving each branch a
significant role and providing checks and balances among the branches vis-
ii-vis administrative agencies. Administrative law is a complex web of
divided authority among the branches of government over the agencies. In
grossly simplified terms, the division is as follows. The legislature creates
an agency, defines its mission and the scope of its authority, establishes its
funding, and conducts oversight to see whether the agency is
accomplishing its purpose and is operating in a fair and non-partisan
fashion. 89 The executive branch effectively operates the agency, through
the chief executive's authority to appoint, with the advice and consent of
the Senate, the officials in charge of the agency1 90 and, at least as
important, to unilaterally remove those officials. Most significantly, it is
the power to fire that gives one control over an employee. 19' The courts
have the power of judicial review to ensure that the agency is acting within
its legislatively-delegated authority, following legislatively-prescribed
procedures, and not acting arbitrarily or capriciously or denying citizens
due process or other constitutionally guaranteed rights. 92
Rhode Island did not follow the federal example. Some Rhode Island
agencies are structured traditionally, with the Governor appointing the
executive director. The legislature, however, has increasingly used a
variety of mechanisms to gain operating control over agencies. Typically,
it accomplishes this by delegating governing duties to a board of directors,
which has the power to appoint and remove the agency's executive
director. Presently, the legislature appoints a total of 234 members on the
governing boards of these seventy-three agencies, in some instances by
filling these seats with members of the General Assembly themselves.'
93
189. One essential strand in the web of relations among the departments was denying to
Congress the ability to reserve to itself the authority to approve regulations. See INS v.
Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 951-58 (1983) (rejecting provisions of an INS Act granting one
House of Congress authority to veto Attorney General decisions to keep an alien in the
country as a separation of powers violation).
190. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 124-36 (1976) (extending the Appointments
Clause of the Constitution to administrative agencies by defining "officers of the United
States" as officials who exercise policy-making authority).
191. See, e.g., Humphrey's Ex'r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 629 (1935) ("For it is
quite evident that one who holds his office only during the pleasure of another cannot be
depended on to maintain an attitude of independence against the latter's will."); Mistretta v.
United States, 488 U.S. 361, 410-11 (1989) (noting that limiting the President's power to
remove judges serving on Sentencing Guidelines Commission for good cause helps "prevent
the President from exercising 'coercive influence' over independent agencies" and does not
affect the tenure of judges serving lifetime appointments on the bench); Bowsher v. Synar,
478 U.S. 714, 726 (1986) ("To permit an officer controlled by Congress to execute the laws
would be, in essence, to permit a congressional veto.").
192. See generally ALFRED C. AMAN, JR. & WILLIAM T.MAYTON, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
338-536 (2d ed. 2001).
193. One-hundred and fifty-six seats are designated for legislators, sixty-six for public
members appointed by either the Speaker of the House or the President of the Senate, and
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The legislature has appointed a majority of governing board members to
some of the state's most powerful agencies, including the Coastal
Resources Management Council, Lottery Commission, 194 Unclassified Pay
Plan Board, 95 and Ethics Commission. 96 But even where the legislature
appoints a minority of members, the influence of their appointees is
disproportionately great because they sit at the table representing the
General Assembly-the institution that decides, among other things, how
much money the agency will receive each year.
197
Issues of legislative control exacerbated the proliferation of Rhode Island
agencies. When Congress establishes a new agency, there is a high level of
confidence that it is doing so for reasons of public policy because the
agency provides Congress with no patronage or other increased powers.
But when a state legislature creates, funds, staffs, and operates a regulatory
agency, there is great capacity for mischief. Among other things, the
legislature gets patronage and the ability to dispense valuable favors by
choosing not to rigorously enforce the law against favored parties.' 98 When
legislators themselves serve on the governing boards of regulatory
agencies, their prestige and perceived influence in that industry is
enhanced, as is their ability to make money in the private sector. 199 These
five for legislative staff. COMMON CAUSE OF R.I., SEPARATION OF POWERS REFERENCE
MANUAL, Tab 3 (June 23,2003) (on file with author).
194. Six of the nine members of the Lottery Commission are, by law, members of the
General Assembly. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 42-61-1 (2002) (providing the Lottery Commission
shall include three members of the Senate and three members of the House of
Representatives).
195. Four of the seven Unclassified Pay Plan Board's members are, by law, members of
the General Assembly. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 36-4-16 (2002). The board establishes the salaries
for all unclassified employees in the state, which includes the heads of departments and
judges for all of the courts, making it a powerful political instrument. R.I. GEN. LAWS §§
36-4-2 (2002), 36-4-16.2.
196. See R.I. GEN. LAWS § 36-14-8 (2002) (providing for selection of five members of
the nine-member Ethics Commission from lists of names submitted by legislative leaders);
see also R.I. CONST. art. Il, § 8 (conferring constitutional status to Ethics Commission by
establishing and authorizing Ethics Commission to administer code of ethics applicable to
all appointed officials and government employees, and allocating power to investigate and
punish those who violate ethics regulations).
197. See BOWERS, supra note 16, at 71-72 (explaining power of legislative committees to
encourage agency compliance through the use of appropriations).
198. A Governor's power of selective enforcement is, to some degree, checked by the
legislative oversight authority.
199. Partly as a result of problems inherent in a part-time, citizen legislature, as well as a
culture that has long tolerated conflicts of interest, Rhode Island has continuing problems
with legislators profiting from their legislative roles in the private sector. See, e.g., Edward
Achron, Opening Fire of R.I. Citizens, PROVIDENCE J., Dec. 9, 2003, at B-05; Katherine
Gregg, CVS Confirms Paying Key Senator as a Consultant, PROVIDENCE J., Dec. 5, 2003, at
A-01 (reporting that state Senator John A. Celona, while serving as chair of the Senate
committee that regulates the health care industry and blocked a so-called "freedom to
choose your pharmacy" bill that was opposed by CVS and supported by competing
pharmacies and received as a "consultant" a monthly retainer from pharmacy chain CVS,
without disclosing it on his ethics filings); Bruce Landis, Ethics Panel Agrees to Investigate
Fox, PROVIDENCE J., Oct. 29, 2003, at B-01; M. Charles Bakst, The Fox Saga: Perceptions
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factors provide incentives for a proliferation of agencies. The situation is
further complicated when, as has been the case from the birth of the
administrative state in the early twentieth century until the state supreme
court decisions in 1999 and 2000, there is confusion about how far the
legislature may go in controlling executive agencies.
During the 1990s, administrative regulation in Rhode Island failed in
multiple ways, ranging from disturbing to catastrophic. Observers linked
these breakdowns to the increasing legislative control of regulatory
functions. These are complicated stories involving many agencies, and I
cannot here relate them all or even one of them in detail.2 °° I shall try,
however, to provide a glimpse of the tip of a very large iceberg.
2. Environmental Protection
Rhode Island has many agencies with various responsibilities for
environmental protection. The largest is the Department of Environmental
Management (DEM), which has general jurisdiction over environmental
protection in the state. 20 1  DEM is administered by a director who is
appointed by the Governor with the advice and consent of the Senate. One
wonders whether it makes sense for the geographically smallest state to
have other environmental agencies. Nevertheless, in 1971, the General
Assembly created the Coastal Resources Management Council (CRMC). 20 2
A sixteen-member council governs CRMC, eight of whom are appointed
by the legislature. In 1980, the legislature created yet another agency, the
Narragansett Bay Commission, to protect the bay from the discharge of
pollutants. By law, the twenty-three members of that commission include
two members of the House and two members of the Senate.20 3
The bloating of bureaucracies is one problem stemming from a lack of
separation of powers, but the politicization of agencies is an even greater
Can be Lethal, PROVIDENCE J., Oct. 2, 2003, at B-01 (reporting that while House Majority
Leader Gordon D. Fox was influential in passing legislation that gave the company GTECH
an exclusive, twenty-year contract to operate the state lottery, while Fox's law firm and Fox
himself were doing legal work for GTECH); Stephanie Rivera, Making a Legislative
Lackey-How Ethics Commission Got Mugged, PROVIDENCE J., Mar. 20, 2001, at B-04
(describing how Ethics Commissioner Thomas D. Goldberg voted to weaken a gift ban rule
and thereby help legislative lobbyists notwithstanding the fact that his own brother and law
partner was one of the state's biggest lobbyists).
200. See generally COMMON CAUSE OF R.I., DEMOCRACY BETRAYED: CONFLICTS OF
INTEREST AND FAILURES OF OVERSIGHT IN RHODE ISLAND GOVERNMENT (2000) [hereinafter
COMMON CAUSE OF R.I.] (summarizing issues involving seven different agencies, with
helpful citations to other relevant sources).
201. See R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 42-17.1-1 to 42-17.1-3 (2002) (assigning power over state
environmental issues to the director of DEM).
202. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 46-23-2 (2002).
203. See R.I. GEN. LAWS § 46-25-6 (2002) (delegating appointment of two House
members to the Speaker of the House and appointment of two Senate members to the Senate
President to serve on the commission).
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concern. Agencies may become improperly politicized under executive
control, of course, but legislative oversight provides some check when that
occurs. When the legislature both operates and oversees agency operation,
however, that safeguard is gone. CRMC has been criticized for operating
in secret, too readily allowing developers to undertake environmentally
detrimental projects, and suffering from politicization and conflicts of
interest. 20 4  It is not a disaster, and the DEM is far from perfect;
nevertheless, with respect to matters involving secrecy, insider influence,
self-dealing, and unequal enforcement of the law, the performance of the
environmental agencies controlled in whole or in part by the legislature
appears worse than that of DEM. And in these kinds of matters, the public
never knows how much lay concealed under the surface.
Individually and collectively, environmental advocacy groups in Rhode
Island have political clout. Forty-two groups belong to the Environmental
Council of Rhode Island (ECRI), including state chapters of national
organizations such as the Sierra Club, Audubon Society, Clean Water
Action, National Wildlife Federation, Nature Conservancy, and American
Lung Association; Providence College and environmental units at Brown
University and the University of Rhode Island; and Save the Bay, which is
not only the state's largest environmental group but also, with 20,000
members and supporters, one of the largest membership organizations of
any kind in Rhode Island.20 5
Environmental groups have long supported separation of powers. They
have a special understanding of how separation of powers affects
environmental regulation in the state. They know the relative performance
of DEM and CRMC. But they are also concerned about preserving their
relationship with legislators so that they may lobby effectively, and in some
cases preserve their ability to obtain grants and other legislatively
dispensed benefits. Thus they preferred to take a back seat role on the
issue.20 6 From 1996 to 1998, several events radicalized the environmental
community on the politics of separation of powers, however, persuading
them to step forward in the battle for separation of powers.
The engine of radicalization was a special committee of the House of
Representatives, formally the "Commission to Study the Department of
Environmental Management and All Matters Relating Thereto, and to
204. See COMMON CAUSE OF R.I., supra note 200, at 32-36.
205. Telephone Interview with Kendra Beaver, Staff Attorney, Save the Bay (June 26,
2003) (providing Save the Bay membership figure).
206. Environmental groups also generally defer to what they view as Common Cause's
greater expertise on matters of general governmental structure. Save the Bay and Common
Cause enjoy especially close relations. Topher Hamblett, Save the Bay's Director of
Advocacy, served for many years on the governing board of Common Cause, and Common
Cause sublets office space from Save the Bay.
ADMINISTRATIVE LA W REVIEW
Make Recommendations Thereto," but generally called the "Kennedy
Commission" after its chairman, Representative Brian P. Kennedy. The
commission held a series of televised, McCarthy-esque hearings that, in the
guise of legislative oversight, seemed principally designed to disparage the
DEM.2 °7 The environmental community was shocked by often personally
vicious and demeaning treatment of DEM employees. Many believed the
legislators' strategy was to diminish DEM's public reputation, thereby
laying the groundwork for legislation that would either transfer much of
DEM's authority to CRMC or merge both agencies into a new entity
controlled by the General Assembly.
At the end of the day, the Kennedy Commission produced the reverse of
its intended result. It was not DEM that was diminished in the eyes of the
public, but the legislature itself. The environmental community saw in the
Kennedy Commission a brazen scheme by the legislature to take control of
all of the state's environmental regulatory apparatus. There was less reason
for environmental groups to preserve a close relationship with so voracious
a legislature. What was the point if environmental regulation would be
destroyed anyway? The ECRI groups ultimately decided to fight
prominently alongside the good government groups, filing an amicus curiae
brief in support of the separation of powers in the state supreme court in
March of 1998.208
3. RISDIC
On December 31, 1990, the Rhode Island Share and Deposit Indemnity
Corporation (RISDIC) declared itself unable to insure deposits of insolvent
207. See, e.g., Peter Lord, Subpoena Powers, Perjury Penalties Await Passage, House
Panel Sets Rules for Probe of DEM, PROVIDENCE J., Feb. 13, 1997, at B-01; Peter Lord, Ex-
DEM Officials Criticize Probe, Ask to Testify Before Committee: All Five Former Directors
Want to Express Their Belief in Strong Environmental Protection, PROVIDENCE J., Feb. 13,
1997, at B-05 (noting hearing commissioner's refusal to allow former DEM directors to
testify about positive aspects of DEM); Scott MacKay, House Approves Subpoena Use by
Committees; Governor Almond Pledges to Veto the Bill He Characterizes as "Reckless, "
PROVIDENCE J., Feb. 27, 1997, at A-01 ("[T]his bill ... was designed to intimidate and
harass employees of DEM. This has the potential for a witch hunt.") (quoting Governor
Almond); Peter Lord, DEM Official Quits, Cites Pressure from Legislative Panel,
PROVIDENCE J., May 1, 1997, at A-01 (highlighting top agency official's resignation after
she was targeted by commission but was refused the opportunity to provide the desired
information in private); Peter Lord, Environmentalists Decry Tank Bill; In a Year When the
Assembly has Turned a Deaf Ear to Environmental Bills, A Half Million Dollar Request
from a Powerful Legislator Gets Quick Approval, PROVIDENCE J., June 21, 1997, at A-01;
C.J. Chivers, Despite Budget Surplus, DEM Blasted for Cash Handling, PROVIDENCE J.,
Aug. 1, 1997, at B-01 (noting commission critiqued DEM's spending and economic
practices while ignoring the fact that DEM spent less overall than its allocated budget in
1996); Peter Lord, "Secret" Meetings on DEM Attacked, PROVIDENCE J., Apr. 22, 1998, at
B-01 (addressing local environmental groups concerns that commission was holding "secret
meetings" to restructure DEM).
208. See In re Advisory Opinion to the Governor, supra note 12 (filing of a brief of
Amicus Curiae by the Environmental Council of Rhode Island, Inc.).
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credit unions and other financial institutions in the state. 20 9 RISDIC was a
private company, regulated by the state, which was established to insure
customer accounts at credit unions in the state. Depositors were stunned.
Through television ads that depicted a hammer and chisel carving the
RISDIC emblem into a piece of granite, depositors had been led to believe
that RISDIC protected their accounts at state credit unions in the same way
that the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) and the Federal
Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation (FSLIC) protected accounts at
federally regulated institutions. On the following day, the newly-elected
Governor closed the forty-five financial institutions supposedly insured by
RISDIC. Fifteen never reopened. The state and private parties ultimately
raised nearly $1 billion dollars to repay depositors at insolvent institutions.
Investigations, including one conducted by an independent panel of
experts chaired by the President of Brown University, 210 and another
conducted by a select commission created by the General Assembly, ll
revealed that both the Governor and leaders in the General Assembly had
long known that RISDIC was incapable of covering losses if even a single
credit union became insolvent. They knew as well that the risks of
insolvency were escalating as the legislature, at the behest of industry
lobbying, was markedly relaxing regulation. In 1985 alone, the Governor
received three separate reports warning of dangers in the RISDIC system-
one from one of the Governor's own advisors, another from the state's
Director of Business Relations (DBR), and a third from the attorney
general's office that Attorney General Arlene Violet considered so
important that she personally handed it to the Governor. However, the
Governor, who had received more than $100,000 in campaign contributions
from seven large borrowers from RISDIC institutions, whose loans were
made possible by the loosened regulations, took no action.
209. See generally Bruce Sandlun, Cleaning Up the Credit-Union Crisis, PROVIDENCE
J., Nov. 18, 2001, at E-10 (providing retrospective of crisis by former Governor who learned
on December 31, 1990, the day before his inauguration, that RISDIC had declared
insolvency). See also Gregory Smith, The Bailout-Taxpayers: Your Bill is 'Ready, Five
Years After the RISDIC Crisis, the Costs are Tallied and Rhode Islanders will Pay Until the
Year 2022, PROVIDENCE J., Mar. 3, 1996, at A-01; Annetta Miller with Debra Rosenberg,
Mad as Hell in Rhode Island, NEWSWEEK, Oct. 7, 1991, at 46; Scott Minerbrook, The Man
Who Picked Rhode Island Clean, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, June 10, 1991, at 36; Fox
Butterfield, Vanished: A Man, $13 million and Faith in State's Banks, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 14,
1991, at A-i; Brian Mooney et al., RI. Officials, Cozy with Bankers, Did Little to Prevent
Crisis, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 6, 1991, at 1 (providing summaries of the RISDIC crisis).
210. See ARTAN GREGORIAN, CARVED IN SAND: A REPORT ON THE COLLAPSE OF THE
RHODE ISLAND SHARE AND INDEMNITY CORPORATION (1991) (discussing the causes and the
leaders responsible for the RISDIC's collapse).
211. See REPORT OF THE SELECT COMMISSION TO INVESTIGATE THE FAILURE OF RISDIC-
INSURED INSTITUTIONS LENDING PRACTICES OF THE RISDIC-INSURED FINANCIAL
INSTITUTIONS (1992) (investigating those individuals and entities whose negligence and/or
misconduct directly or indirectly contributed to the financial loss sustained by the state and
its citizens).
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Both of the investigations blamed the RISDIC crisis, in significant part,
on conflicts of interest by legislators. For example, one state senator was
simultaneously the director of a credit union with a soaring deficit and a
member of a Senate committee that killed legislation that would have
required credit unions to obtain federal deposit insurance.212 A state
representative was both chair of the House Corporations Committee and a
member of the Board of Bank Incorporation. According to one of the
reports, this legislator "played a prominent role in the shaping of bank
legislation ' 213 at the same time he was receiving such significant favors
from RISDIC and one of its insured institutions-including a large loan
that was often in default, and junkets at RISDIC's expense-as to be "a
captive of the RISDIC lobby.
' 2 14
The most extreme example may have been state Representative Robert
V. Bianchini. Bianchini was vice chair of the House Finance Committee,
and, according to reports, the House leadership gave him final say over all
legislation relating to the regulation of credit unions. During the same
time, Bianchini21 5 served as president of the Rhode Island Credit Union
League, the trade association that lobbied the legislature on behalf of the
industry. If ever there was a classic example of a conflict of interest, the
principle that no person shall be a judge in his own cause, this was it. Yet,
this was not all. Bianchini also served on the State Investment
Commission, the agency that approved the investment of millions of dollars
in state funds in credit unions.21 6 Additionally, he attended meetings of the
Unclassified Pay Plan Board, the agency that controlled the salaries of the
director of the Department of Business Regulation and the General
Treasurer, the officials with regulatory authority over the credit unions and
RISDIC.217 How free are regulators to blow a whistle that will offend
someone who helps set their salaries?
4. The Unclassified Pay Plan Board
The Unclassified Pay Plan Board (Board) provides a striking example of
how abandoning the principle of separation of powers allows the
consolidation and misuse of power, particularly legislative power. Since
1978, when the Board was reconstituted to give the legislature a controlling
number of seats, it has become a powerful mechanism for the legislature to
212. See COMMON CAUSE OF R.I., supra note 200, at 4-5 (implicating Senator John
Correia).
213. See id at 4 (quoting the Report of the Select Committee) (implicating
Representative Joseph Casinelli as a legislature who played a role in shaping the bank
legislation).
214. See id (quoting the report of the Senate committee).
215. See id. at 3-4.
216. See id.
217. COMMON CAUSE OF R.I., supra note 200, at 3-4.
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influence executive officials, and perhaps judicial officials as well.
There are two employment systems in Rhode Island government.
Approximately 85 percent of state workers are in the "classified" or
competitive system in which jobs must be advertised, candidates tested,
and jobs filled on the basis of specified criteria. The "unclassified" system
comprises about 2,500 political appointees. These include the heads of
governmental departments and agencies as well as all employees within the
judicial branch, from judges to law clerks and secretaries.
One notorious incident illustrates how the legislature can use the Board
to assert its will in the other branches of government. During the 1980s
and 1990s, the chairman of the state's Public Utility Commission (PUC),
James Malachowski, took a number of positions that annoyed powerful
legislators. For example, under his leadership, the PUC disapproved a
number of rate increases requested by the Narragansett Bay Commission, a
state agency that was chaired by state Representative Vincent Mesolella.
Mesolella introduced legislation to exempt the Narragansett Bay
Commission from PUC oversight authority, but Malachowski opposed that
legislation, and it was ultimately defeated. In 1994, Malachowski
frustrated efforts by the Narragansett Bay Commission by awarding a
sludge incinerator contract to a single bidder whose employees routinely
made political contributions to Mesolella. In 1996, Malachowski opposed
legislation that would both deregulate the state's electrical industries and
split the PUC into two entities that would be controlled by the legislature
rather than the Governor. In what Common Cause of Rhode Island stated
"was widely understood to be retribution against him for the PUC's vigilant
and independent regulatory stance," in February 1997, the Unclassified Pay
Plan Board cut Malachowski's salary by $12,000, from some $94,000 to
$81,293.2 8
The legislature, of course, has the authority to set the salaries of officials
in the executive branch, from the Governor on down. However, there is an
enormous political difference between having salaries set by a small group,
such as the Unclassified Pay Plan Board, and requiring the legislature to do
so by enacting legislation. The legislative process not only requires
majority votes in two chambers and supermajorities to overcome
gubernatorial vetoes; it also requires that at least the number of legislators
necessary to constitute a quorum cast public votes, and thus be politically
accountable for their decisions. Delegating this power to an entity such as
the Unclassified Pay Plan Board permits legislative leaders to stack the
Board with loyal members from politically safe seats and work their will
218. See id at 53 (stating that Unclassified Pay Plan Board reasoned that the split of the
PUC into two divisions caused a reduction in Malachowski's responsibilities and thus
necessitated the pay cut).
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with diminished public accountability. While Malachowski was an
extraordinary public servant who was not intimidated by the legislative
leaders' control over his salary, this incident sent a loud and clear message
to those who were not as brave.
219
F. Reform Efforts Sour
The battle for separation of powers was not the only attempt to amend
the state constitution to curb legislative power. Reform groups 220 fought
hard for, and won, what they expected to be two significant amendments.
In the late 1980s, they successfully won an amendment to the state
constitution requiring the General Assembly to "establish an independent
non-partisan ethics commission which shall adopt a code of ethics
including, but not limited to, provisions on conflict of interest. 22' The
commission was to be empowered to investigate and impose penalties for
ethics violations. The objective was to outlaw conflicts of interest that so
plagued Rhode Island government, especially conflicts of interest involving
219. See infra notes 260-273 and accompanying text (discussing how officials in
executive branch tried to help House Speaker John Harwood escape from the Wendy
Collins scandal).
220. The state's major governmental reform groups were:
1. Common Cause of Rhode Island. Common Cause of Rhode Island was
established in 1970, the same year as the national organization. From the start, that
group benefited from strong volunteer leadership, and it became even more
effective after hiring an indefatigable executive director, H. Philip West, Jr., in
1988. But it has been since 1994, when it made separation of powers its highest
priority, that Common Cause achieved its greatest support. Today, Common Cause
of Rhode Island has 2,400 members, making it one of the largest chapters in the
nation proportionate to state size. Even more telling is that since becoming the
state's leading champion of separation of powers, Common Cause of Rhode Island
raised more money than any other Common Cause chapter in the nation, including
chapters in California or New York State. Telephone Interview with H. Philip
West, Jr., Executive Director, Common Cause of Rhode Island (June 26, 2003).
2. RIght Now! Following the RISDIC calamity, a number of new citizen groups
were formed. One, known as the RIght Now!, was a temporary coalition of citizen
organizations formed to advocate a package of reform measures. It included
Common Cause, the Urban League, local chambers of commerce, and many
religious groups. Rhode Islanders still talk about the day church bells rang in
unison throughout the state, sounding a clarion call for reform.
Telephone Interviews with Beverley M. Clay, First Vice Chair, Operation Clean
Government (March 2003) and Bruce Lang, Co-Founder, Operation Clean
Government (June 27, 2003).
3. Operation Clean Government. In 1993, several groups that had formed in
reaction to the RISDIC crisis merged to create the state's second permanent
governmental reform organization, Operation Clean Government, which currently
has about 2,200 members. Operation Clean Government played a dynamic role in
the battle for separation of powers. For example, in March 2003, it distributed
80,000 special newsletters as a four-page insert to local newspapers in legislatively
targeted districts. Telephone Interviews with Beverley M. Clay, First Vice Chair,
Operation Clean Government (March 2003) and Bruce Lang, Co-Founder,
Operation Clean Government (June 27, 2003).
221. R.I. CONST. art. III, § 8.
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legislators. In 1994, after two consecutive chief justices of the state
supreme court were forced from office as a result of misconduct,22 the
constitution was amended to replace the prior system of judicial selection,
under which the General Assembly had selected the justices for the state
supreme court, with a merit selection system.2 3 To their proponents'
horror, however, both reforms seemed to turn to dust.
I shall not relate all of the complaints about the Ethics Commission.
Probably the most devastating episode occurred on May 23, 2000, when,
notwithstanding a loud public outcry,224 the Commission voted to allow
public officials, including members of the General Assembly, to receive
gifts totaling up to $450 per year from parties "interested" in legislation. 5
Previously, public officials had been barred from accepting gifts of any
kind or in any amount. The new rule allowed them to receive unlimited
income from interested persons, provided only that no one gift exceeded
$150, that gifts from a single person not exceed $450 annually, and
(perhaps) that gifts not be in cash. A professional lobbyist who represented
100 clients could legally bestow a legislator with a bouquet of 100 gifts,
each one with an individual value of up to $150 from each client. The rule
passed 5-4 on the strength of votes from the members of the Commission
appointed by the General Assembly.
The deciding vote was cast by Thomas H. Goldberg, whose brother,
Robert, was the state's sixth highest paid lobbyist.2 6 Moreover, Thomas
and Robert were law partners, and Thomas presumably shared in that
income and would benefit from his brother's enhanced value as a
lobbyist.227 Good government groups asked Commissioner Goldberg to
222. See supra note 91 and accompanying text.
223. R.I. CONST. art. X, § 4.
224. See Christopher Rowland, Ethics Panel Under Attack, PROVIDENCE J., May 2,
2000, at A-0 1 (reporting the change was met by an "outcry" from citizen groups and that no
one testified in favor of the new rule); see also Editorial, Too Generous to Solons,
PROVIDENCE J., May 10, 2000, at B-06 (stating "public interest groups and average citizens
have risen up to protest the commission's plan").
225. See R.I. CODER. 36-14-5009 (2000) (overturning prior ban on all gifts to legislators
by interested parties, including lobbyists).
226. See Bruce Landis, Member Sues Ethics Commission to Clarify Possible Conflict,
PROVIDENCE J., Oct. 7, 1999, at B-04 (noting the Ethics Commission member, whose
brother was a prominent lobbyist in Rhode Island, who sought to have a local court clarify
whether he was able to participate in legislative votes concerning lobbyists without violating
Rhode Island's code of ethics); see also Common Cause of R.I., Top Ten Commercial
Lobbyists, 1999 COMMON CAUSE OF R.I. REPORT, at 8 (reporting that Robert Goldberg's
annual lobbying income exceeded $120,000, giving him the sixth highest lobbying revenue
in Rhode Island).
227. See Katherine Gregg, New Furor Arising over Ethics Dispute, PROVIDENCE J., Mar.
8, 2001, at A-01 (discussing the Goldberg brother's resistance of subpoenas for this info,
though the courts never decided whether the subpoenas were to be enforced because the
litigation was deflected by the issue of whether the attorney representing the Ethics
Commission had improperly failed to seek admission pro hac vice); see also id. at A-01
(highlighting attempts by Ethics Commission member Goldberg to remove an out-of-state
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recuse himself because of his conflict of interest, but he refused.228 They
later filed an ethics complaint against him for having voted despite a
conflict of interest, but the commission's investigation of this complaint
stalled, preventing a final decision from being reached within the required
statutory time.
2 2 9
In retrospect, reformers recognized the reform was doomed when they
settled for a constitutional amendment that permitted the General Assembly
to organize the Ethics Commission as it saw fit, which allowed the
legislature to reserve to itself the authority to appoint a majority of the
commissioners.
The judicial merit selection system had the same flaw. The new system
created a judicial nominating commission, but effectively gave the General
Assembly the ability to select five of the nine members of that
commission. 230 As the Governor was required to select supreme court
justices from lists provided by the judicial nominating commission, this
gave the General Assembly the ability to all but select nominees. If this
were not enough, the Senate and the House were each given the power of
advice and consent, and thus the ability to veto nominations to the court.
The chickens came home to roost in January 1997 when Governor
Almond nominated Margaret E. Curran to the state supreme court. Curran
had fine credentials, a high reputation for professional skill and integrity,
and sterling recommendations from distinguished lawyers and jurists. 23'
lawyer investigating ethics complaints against him and generally engaging in stall tactics to
avoid an adverse decision on his conflict of interest concerning voting for lobbyist
legislation); see Karen Lee Ziner, Court Rejects Effort by Ethics Commission to Subpoena
Member, PROVIDENCE J., Jan. 31, 2001, at B-03 (noting a successful ruling in favor of
Ethics Commission member Goldberg who sought to avoid answering a subpoena issued by
the lawyer investigating ethics complaints against him).
228. See Rowland, supra note 224 (noting Commission members Francis Flanagan and
Richard Kirby defended Goldberg while criticizing H. Philip West, Jr., Executive Director
of Common Cause of Rhode Island, for questioning the potential conflict of interest of a
Commission member voting on legislation affecting his brother and law partner).
229. See Jonathan D. Rockoff, Ethics Panel Fires its Director, PROVIDENCE J., Apr. 4,
2001, at A-01 (explaining how Common Cause's ethics complaint against an Ethics
Commission member was dismissed due to failure to meet the required deadline); see also
Carl T. Bogus, Exactly Why Judicial Silence is Golden, PROVIDENCE J., Apr. 12, 2001, at B-
06 (arguing that Rhode Island Supreme Court justices who denied an out-of-state lawyer
permission to continue investigating ethics violations of Commission members, thus causing
delay that led to dismissal of certain complaints, should have explained the reasoning that
led to the decision in their judicial opinions, not in the media).
230. See R.I. CONST. art. X, §§ 4-5 (requiring advice and consent of each individual
House of the state legislature to appoint Rhode Island Supreme Court justices). See also
Barton P. Jenks, III, Rhode Island's New Judicial Merit Selection Law, 1 ROGER WILLIAMS
U. L. REV. 63, 71 (1996) (arguing that the new system had many flaws, one of the most
serious was "the degree to which it provides for the involvement of legislators in the judicial
selection process").
231. See M. Charles Bakst, Margaret Curran: First Impressions, PROVIDENCE J., Jan. 5,
1997, at D-01 (quoting U.S. District Judge Bruce Selya, with whom she clerked, who said of
Curran at the time of her nomination, "[a]mong my colleagues on the Court of Appeals, she
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Nevertheless, the House rejected her nomination. It claimed that at forty-
four years of age, she was "too young" and that, because most of her work
had been in the federal courts, she lacked state courtroom experience,
notwithstanding that having argued 152 cases before the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the First Circuit, Curran's appellate experience may have been
unmatched in the state.232 Many believed the proffered reasons were mere
pretext and that the real reason was that Curran was too independent,
especially on the looming issue of separation of powers.2 33  The woman
ultimately confirmed for that seat was the wife of Robert Goldberg, a
former member of the General Assembly.
234
Prior to the reform in judicial selection, when the General Assembly
appointed members of the bench itself, the legislature often appointed its
own members to the state supreme court. 235 The catalyst for reform was
the General Assembly's failure to appoint justices with integrity. The last
two chief justices appointed under the prior system were Joseph A.
Bevilacqua, Speaker of the House, and Thomas F. Fay, chair of the House
Judiciary Committee. Both resigned from the court in disgrace as a result
of improper conduct, with Fay receiving a criminal conviction for graft.236
The 1997 reforms were not devoid of benefit. So far at least, they appear
to have elevated appointments in terms of integrity and competence.237 Yet
is regarded as one of the two or three best attorneys who regularly appear before us, because
of the quality of her briefs and her skill and advocacy"); see also John E. Mulligan, Curran
Confirmed as U.S. Attorney by Senate, PROVIDENCE J., Oct. 22, 1998, at B-01 (noting the
unusual swiftness of Curran's nomination by President Bill Clinton and confirmation as a
U.S. Attorney for Rhode Island); Karen Lee Ziner, Curran to Remain US. Attorney,
PROVIDENCE J., Mar. 19, 2001, at B-08 (highlighting a recommendation from a state
Republican senator to President Bush helped Democrat Curran keep her job as a Rhode
Island U.S. Attorney making her one of only a dozen of the previously appointed ninety-
three U.S. Attorneys retained by President George W Bush).
232. See Scott MacKay, House Leaders Flex Muscles; The Defeat of Supreme Court
Nominee Margaret E. Curran Shows that the Democratic Leadership Can Do as It Pleases,
PROVIDENCE J., Jan. 30, 1997, at A-01 (addressing the superior position which the House
democratic leaders held when they rejected Curran's nomination); see also Jonathan D.
Rockoff, et al., House Panel Rejects Curran Nomination; The Judiciary Committee, After
Criticizing Margaret E. Curran's Youth and Lack of Rhode Island Courtroom Experience
Votes 11 to 6 Against Her, PROVIDENCE J., Jan. 23, 1997, at A-01 (noting opposition to
Curran's nomination centered on her federal, not state, court experience and young age).
233. See Russell Garland & Scott MacKay, House Rejects Curran; Critics Cite Court
Candidate's Lack of Experience, PROVIDENCE J., Jan. 29, 1997, at A-01 (quoting House
Judiciary Committee member Timothy Williamson on the political tint to Currant's
rejection, "Was she a sacrificial lamb? Yes, she was. But that's politics.").
234. For more about Goldberg, see supra notes 226-229, infra note 238, and
accompanying text.
235. See Leslie Alan Horvitz, Corruption Big in Poor, Little Rhode Island, WASH.
TIMES, Dec. 28, 1993, at A-7 (observing that as "Rhode Island is one of only three states ...
where the selection of judges is entirely the prerogative of the legislature [i]t should come as
little surprise that all five current members [of the state supreme court] are former members
of the General Assembly.").
236. See supra note 91 and accompanying text.
237. See Michael J. Yelnosky, Rhode Island's Judicial Nominating Commission: Can
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a majority of supreme court justices appointed since 1997 have either
themselves been former members of the General Assembly, married to
former members, or siblings of current members. 238 The close connection
between the courts and the legislature is disturbing no matter how capable
and conscientious the justices may be. Consider the federal model.
Because the United States Supreme Court must frequently resolve disputes
between the legislative and executive branches, would it be considered
acceptable if the majority of the justices were former members of
Congress? The situation in Rhode Island was even worse because of the
special importance of separation of powers in cases that have come, and are
likely to come, before the court, and, in this respect at least, the 1997
reform failed.239
The failures of these reforms-with respect to both the Ethics
Commission and judicial merit selection-poured gasoline on the fires
already burning for separation of powers.
III. THE FINAL BATTLE
The battle for separation of powers reached its crescendo with two
events in 2002. After years of vigorous public education and lobbying by
public advocacy groups, a proposed constitutional amendment to
incorporate separation of powers into the state constitution reached the
floor of the Rhode Island House of Representatives on April 11, 2002.
Sponsors had been led to believe the measure would be debated and voted
"Reform" Become Reality?, 1 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 87, 99-100, 117-30 (1996)
(arguing reforms in judicial selection process improved with the creation of the judicial
nominating commission that engaged in a more rigorous screening process, conducting open
candidate interviews, public meetings for comment on potential nominees, and public
votes).
238. See generally Russell Garland, Almond, Legislators Square Off in Court Case,
PROVIDENCE J., Dec. 28, 1997, at A-01 (listing the biographical information of Joseph R.
Weisberger who was an associate justice from 1978-1993, a chief justice from 1993-2001
and a former minority leader in state Senate; of Justice Victoria Lederberg (1993-2002) who
was a former member of the state House of Representatives; and of Justice Maureen
McKenna Goldberg (1997-present) who is married to Robert Goldberg, and was also a
former minority leader in the state Senate). See Katherine Gregg, House Bill Zips Through
Hearing Minus Testimony, PROVIDENCE J., May 28, 2003, at B-01 (stating Justice Francis
X. Flaherty (2003-present) as the brother of Robert Flaherty, who is chairman of the House
Judiciary Committee); Liz Anderson, Senate Confirms Suttell to Supreme Court,
PROVIDENCE J., June 20, 2003, at B-01 (noting that Justice Paul A. Suttell (2003-present)
was a former state legislator and worked for three years as legal counsel for the House
minority leader).
239. See Barbara Dickinson et al., Carcieri Should Appoint Women Judges, PROVIDENCE
J., June 30, 2003, at A-07 (raising questions about the lack of racial and gender diversity
among state judges and characterizing current paucity of diversity as "scandalous"); see
also Bruce Landis, Suttell Endorsed by House Panel Amid Complaints, PROVIDENCE J., June
11, 2003, at A-01 (expressing widespread disappointment of minority leaders over House
Judiciary Committee's failure to submit an esteemed African-American female judge as a
nominee for the state Supreme Court).
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upon, but House leadership surprised them with a sudden parliamentary
maneuver that killed the measure without either a debate or a vote. 240 "If
we are playing a clever game, congratulations, you have just scammed the
people of the state of Rhode Island," the House minority leader said in
frustration.241
The episode ignited a public firestorm. Legislators were lambasted in
newspaper editorials, 242 op-ed articles, 243 and letters to the editor.244 Local
talk radio programs were consumed with the issue for days on end, with
callers and hosts alike vowing to turn out of office legislators who opposed
the amendment. 245 So many angry citizens logged on to the secretary of
state's website to get their representatives' telephone numbers and e-mail
addresses that the system crashed.246 Eager to avoid becoming targets
themselves, state senators brought a parallel measure to the floor of that
chamber and passed it by a vote of forty to six.
247
The forty-nine representatives who opposed separation of powers found
themselves alone at the center of a political bull's eye. Under normal
conditions some may have felt confident at surviving even this storm; in a
typical election about half of all of the seats in the Rhode Island are
248
uncontested in either the primary or the general election. But this
240. See Edward Fitzpatrick, House Leaders Block "Powers" Bill, PROVIDENCE J., Apr.
11, 2002, at B-01 (explaining that had both legislative chambers passed the bill, it would
have placed the proposed constitutional amendment on the ballot at the next general election
for ratification by the voters. House leaders orchestrated a vote, which passed 49-38, to
recommit the bill to the House Judiciary Committee, which had previously rejected the
amendment).
241. Id.
242. "Last week, citizens bombarded lawmakers with phone calls, demanding a binding
vote on a constitutional amendment to balance powers in Rhode Island, the way it is done in
[forty-nine] states and the federal government .... Yet, in spite of that uprising, those who
run the legislature chose to keep treating the citizens with contempt." Editorial, Ignoring
the Voters, PROVIDENCE J., Apr. 17 ,2002, at B-06. The editorial went on to urge citizens to
call legislators and published the telephone numbers of the speaker of the House and the
Senate majority leader, and listed (for the second time) all forty-nine members of the House
who had voted to kill the amendment. Id.
243. E.g., Rod Driver, R.I. Separation of Powers-The Good Guys Ambushed Again,
PROVIDENCE J., Apr. 26, 2002, at B-05 (describing House members' tactic of moving to
return a bill to committee to thwart debates on the bill as trickery).
244. See Thomas K. DiPaola, Letter to the Editor, Dump the Democrats, PROVIDENCE J.,
Apr. 23, 2002, at B-05 (arguing that the Democratic party controls every aspect of
government in Rhode Island and is responsible for steering the state into moral and fiscal
bankruptcy).
245. This is based on listening to the radio myself. From the portions I heard, it
appeared that at least four of the most popular local talk shows, the Steve Kass and Dan
Yorke shows on WPRO-AM and the John DePetro and Arlene Violet shows on WHJJ, were
devoted nearly exclusively to the issue for days.
246. See Ignoring the Voters, supra note 242 (noting that citizens' outrage did not
prevent House Speaker John Harwood from "bouncing" the balance-of-powers bill back to
the House Judiciary Committee earlier in the month, essentially killing the bill).
247. See Edward Fitzpatrick, Senate OKs Power Separation, PROVIDENCE J., May 31,
2002, at B-01.
248. See Scott MacKay, It's No Contest: Democracy is Withering in Rhode Island,
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particular year the state legislature was being downsized-the Senate was
shrinking from fifty to thirty-eight and the House from 100 to seventy-five
members-and a number of incumbents were being forced to run against
other incumbents. Less than a third of the seats were uncontested.249
In the late spring of 2002, a new group called the Rhode Island
Separation of Powers Committee (RISOP) was formed with the principal
mission of running newspaper advertisements during the fall campaign to
again publicize how the candidates stood on separation of powers. RISOP
leaders debated internally whether to stick legislators with their prior votes
or to give them a chance to switch sides. RISOP decided to ask all
candidates, incumbents and challengers alike, regardless of prior positions,
to sign a pledge promising to support separation of powers in the future.2
Like rats jumping off a sinking ship, many opponents seized the
opportunity to become supporters of separation of powers. Nearly all of
the forty-nine opponents in the House either switched sides or were
defeated in the fall.2 51
This alone would probably have been sufficient to bring the long battle
for separation of powers in Rhode Island to a successful conclusion. But
like a perfect storm, 252 another event added still more momentum. In the
late summer and early fall of 2002, a scandal broke involving the powerful
Speaker of the House, John B. Harwood.
This is a long and messy story that unfolded piece by piece, but it can be
sketched as follows. 253  In the spring of 1999, Harwood, fifty, met a
PROVIDENCE J., July 9, 2000, at A-01.
249. See Edward Fitzpatrick, Downsized Assembly Prompts More Vigorous Races,
PROVIDENCE J., Sept. 8, 2002, at D-01.
250. The pledge read: "If I am elected to public office in Rhode Island this year, I will
support a constitutional amendment to incorporate the principle of Separation of Powers
among the three branches of government, and if I am elected to the General Assembly, I will
vote for a Separation of Powers amendment and support procedural measures designed to
bring it to the floor for a vote."
251. I favored rewarding or punishing incumbents for their actual votes. In retrospect,
offering legislators a chance to switch was the savvy strategy; my approach may have
solidified opposition.
252. Borrowing the title for Sebastian Junger's popular book, H. Philip West, Jr. adopted
the term "perfect storm" to refer to the confluence of three events that swept separation of
powers to ultimate success: the House using what was considered unfair political maneuver
to kill separation of powers in 2002 session; legislative downsizing; and the Harwood-
Collins scandal.
253. For the most comprehensive, single description of the Harwood-Collins story, see
Edward Fitzpatrick, Harwood v. Collins- 7 Did Nothing Wrong,' PROVIDENCE J., Oct. 13,
2002, at A-01.
For discussion of the political ramifications of the incident, see M. Charles Bakst,
The Settlement: Can Harwood Survive Furor?, PROVIDENCE J., Aug. 29, 2002, at B-01;
Edward Fitzpatrick, Party Support Crumbling for Harwood, PROVIDENCE J., Sept. 18, 2002,
at A-01; Edward Fitzpatrick, Events Reaching Critical Mass for Harwood-Jurors Hear
Collins Coworker, PROVIDENCE J., Oct. 4, 2002, at A-01; Edward Achorn, The Roar that
R. Leaders Heard, PROVIDENCE J., May 20, 2003, at B-05. See also Katherine Gregg,
Pires Questions Settlement Payments, PROVIDENCE J., Aug. 16, 2002, at A-01; Katherine
[56:1
SEPARATION OF POWERS IN RHODE ISLAND
twenty-eight year old woman named Wendy L. Collins while both were
waiting for an elevator. Harwood was married and an attorney. Collins
was a single mother and a high school graduate who was then unemployed
but had previously worked as a secretary, bookkeeper, laborer, and
bartender in a strip club.254 Although one suspects it would have been
unusual for the Speaker to personally interview and hire low level
employees, and Collins's work history did not seem to qualify her for a
such a position, Harwood nonetheless asked Collins to call on him at the
State House and hired her as a legislative researcher. 255 "He told me to
bring a book because it was going to be kind of boring," Collins told a
reporter.256
But perhaps not boring enough. Collins said she was required to perform
oral sex for Harwood. When, approximately two years later, she insisted
on discontinuing the practice, she was harassed by co-workers, became
emotionally distraught, took sick leave, and was subsequently fired for
"excessive absenteeism."2 57 Collins engaged counsel and filed a workers
compensation claim. Her complaint stated that she was unable to work as a
result of, among other things, "sexual harassment and retaliation., 258 When
the story became public, Harwood denied any sexual relationship with
Collins, and Collins never produced a blue dress 259 definitively
corroborating her own allegations.
It is the next aspect of this story-palpably improper actions that state
officials took to protect Harwood from Collins's allegations-that are
instructive regarding the concentration of power in Rhode Island and
pertinent to the battle for separation of powers.
Collins's compensation claim did not immediately come to the attention
Gregg, Harwood Asks Police Probe of 'Demands' by Ex- Worker, PROVIDENCE J., Aug. 28,
2002, at A-01; Katherine Gregg, The Collins Case-Report of Alleged 'Sexual Favors 'for
Harwood Factored into State's Deal with Collins, PROVIDENCE J., Sept. 20, 2002, at A-01;
Edward Fitzpatrick, RIC Job Both Puzzling and Welcome, PROVIDENCE J., Sept. 24, 2002, at
A-13; M. Charles Bakst, Harwood Chaos: From Strange to Surreal, PROVIDENCE J., Sept.
28, 2002, at A-03; Katherine Gregg, Harwood Resolute As Calls for His Resignation Grow,
PROVIDENCE J., Oct. 3, 2002, at A-01; W. Zachary Malinowski, Grand Jury Rules Out
Indictments in Collins Case, PROVIDENCE J., Oct. 26, 2002, at A-01.
254. See Fitzpatrick, Harwood v. Collins, supra note 253.
255. Harwood originally told Collins that she would be hired as a proofreader. When
Collins reported for work on the first day, Kearns and another staffer told her that instead
she would be a legislative researcher. See id
256. Id.
257. See Katherine Gregg, Carl Seen Playing Key Role in Collins Settlement,
PROVIDENCE J., Sept. 25, 2002, at A-0 1; Katherine Gregg, Harwood 'Rather Angry'-House
Speaker Denies Any Relationship with Former Worker, PROVIDENCE J., Aug. 23, 2002, at
A-01.
258. See Katherine Gregg, Harwood Says He Knew of Collins's Allegations Earlier,
PROVIDENCE J., Sept. 28, 2002, at A-01.




of the press. To head off that revelation, the parties cut a secret deal.
Collins's attorney blacked out the phrase "sexual harassment and
retaliation" on the complaint in the court file, and Collins promised to
forever remain silent about those allegations. In return, Collins received
$75,000 in worker's compensation payments and a new job. A new
permanent position-"property coordinator," with an annual salary of
$28,009-was created at Rhode Island College (a public university)
specifically for Collins. An internal memorandum confirming the
arrangement read, "[A]n agreement has been reached between the director
of administration, the commissioner of higher education and the President
of Rhode Island College to transfer funding sufficient to cover the salary
and benefits as well as providing one (full-time equivalent) to the college's
annual budget. The employee's name is Wendy Collins., 260 This was the
first time in twenty-five years that a new full-time position of any kind-
administration, faculty, or staff-had been created for Rhode Island
College.261
A number of people were involved in making this arrangement on behalf
of the state. Harwood was, of course, involved, as were two attorneys
representing him personally: Richard P. Kearns, the speaker's chief legal
262
counsel at the State House, 2 and the ubiquitous lawyer and lobbyist
Robert Goldberg,263 whom Harwood apparently engaged as private
counsel. Two lawyers-Samuel L. DiSano, a deputy in the state workers
compensation office, and Eric B. Sweet, a staff attorney in that office-
ostensibly represented the state. However, when DiSano presented the
proposed settlement to his superior, Frank P. Knight, the state's workers
compensation administrator, Knight ultimately refused to approve it.
264
Moreover, Knight instructed DiSano to write a memorandum outlining the
details of the case.265
260. Gregg, Carl Seen Playing Key Role in Collins Settlement, supra note 257
(explaining the memorandum was sent from the college's human resources director to
Robert L. Carl, Jr., the state's director of administration).
261. See id. (adding that during those twenty-five years, positions were added to certain
departments only when a corresponding position was eliminated).
262. See Katherine Gregg and Tracy Brenton, Collins' Lawyer: Harwood's Story
'Fiction,' PROVIDENCE J., Oct. 19, 2002, at A-01 (relating settlement events, according to
Collins' lawyer, in which Kearns played a key role, particularly in his efforts to ensure that
all evidence implicating the speaker were destroyed).
263. See supra notes 226-229 and accompanying text; see also Bruce Landis, Harwood's
Hiring of Lawyer to be Probed, PROVIDENCE J., Jan. 24, 2003, at B-03 (reporting that
Operation Clean Government filed a complaint with the state's ethics commission
contending that Harwood violated conflict of interest rules in hiring a lobbyist to represent
him in the Collins case).
264. See Katherine Gregg et al., 2d Worker Alleges Threat in Collins Case, PROVIDENCE
J., Oct. 2, 2002, at A-01 (noting Knight initially agreed to approve the deal but changed his
mind).
265. See Katherine Gregg, Carcieri: Investigate Lawyer's 'Threat,' PROVIDENCE J., Oct.
1, 2002, at A-08 (adding that Knight stated that DiSano refused his direct order to write an
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DiSano refused to write that memorandum. Instead, he threatened
Knight, who was seventy-five years old and close to retirement, with the
loss of his pension should he disclose anything about the matter.2 66
Because Knight refused to sign the necessary paperwork, Robert L. Carl,
Jr. approved the deal. Carl, a powerful figure in his own right within
Rhode Island government, was the director of the department of
administration and a member of the Governor's Cabinet. Involving
someone as high ranking as Carl in the settlement of an individual workers
compensation claim would have been unusual if not unprecedented. But
Carl did not merely sign the papers; he also called the commissioner of
higher education to arrange for Collins's job at Rhode Island College.26 7
Carl maintained that he personally approved this particular workers
compensation settlement over the objection of the administrator of the
workers compensation bureau and helped create a new position at Rhode
Island College specifically for Collins without ever knowing about Collins'
allegations that Harwood had sexually harassed her. Carl's claim was so
preposterous that it "didn't pass the laugh test," as then gubernatorial
candidate Donald L. Carcieri put it.268 Carcieri was subsequently elected
Governor and did not reappoint Carl.269
Carl made another claim that people unfamiliar with Rhode Island might
think equally implausible. He said he never informed his boss, Governor
Lincoln Almond, about the Collins case. Almond said that had he known,
he would not have permitted the case to be settled.270 Although bizarre,
outline of the case).
266. See Gregg, 2d Worker Alleges Threat, supra note 264 (asserting that although
DiSano denied threatening Knight, Knight's deputy confirmed hearing DiSano tell Knight
more than once that "anyone who talked [about the Collins' case] would lose their state job
and pension").
267. See Gregg, Carl Seen Playing Key Role in Collins Settlement, supra note 257.
268. Fitzpatrick, Harwood v. Collins-'I Did Nothing Wrong,' supra note 253.
269. See Mark Arsenault, Carcieri Filling Key Posts With Business Leaders,
PROVIDENCE J., Dec. 20, 2002, at A-01.
As for other players, see also Katherine Gregg, Harwood Won't Run As Speaker -
Murphy, of W. Warwick, Will Succeed the Embattled Pawtucket Democrat, PROVIDENCE J.,
Nov. 8, 2002, at A-01 (affirming John B. Harwood lost the speakership); John Castellucci,
Bayuk Concedes; Harwood Keeps Seat, PROVIDENCE J., Nov. 23, 2002, at A-01 (asserting
Harwood barely won reelection in his district after a political unknown launched a last
minute write-in campaign against him). See also Katherine Gregg, Kearns Removed from
Assembly's Spending Panel, PROVIDENCE J., Feb. 1, 2003, at A-01 (explaining Richard P.
Kearns lost an important position as head of the group that determines hiring and spending
at the State House, but kept his $131,000 position as State House legal counsel after
William Murphy replaced Harwood as Speaker); see also Malinowski, supra note 253
(discussing the grand jury investigation of the Collins case and the fact the grand jury did
not hand up any indictments).
270. See Katherine Gregg, Officials on Defensive-Almond, Aides Say They Didn't Know
of Harassment Allegations, PROVIDENCE J., Sept. 27, 2002, at A-01 (quoting Governor
Almond who stated, "If there was a sexual-harassment allegation against a high official, the
speaker or anyone else, it should have gone to trial." "You just don't let these things [hang]
out there.").
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this is not incredible. Carl was appointed by the Governor and served at his
pleasure. Nevertheless, Carl had ambitions, 27' and he understood that the
real power resided in the Speaker's office.
One might expect legislative employees such as Richard Kearns to try to
protect their boss, but what is so illuminating about the case is that officials
within the executive branch did so as well. They took significant personal
risks to serve, not their formal superiors, but the Speaker of the House.
DiSano refused an order from his immediate boss and then boldly
threatened him, even doing so in the presence of others. How did he
explain this insubordination? DiSano told Knight that Carl had personally
chosen DiSano to be "the point man" on Harwood's sexual harassment
case. 272  Knight took no part in what he considered an improper
arrangement, but apparently he was sufficiently cowed by DiSano's threat
to silently accept the insult and to refrain from telling Governor Almond
about the case.273 Carl, a member of the Governor's own Cabinet, went to
extreme lengths to protect the speaker while concealing from the Governor
something of titanic political importance.
This event was emblematic of something the public already
understood-the dynamics of concentrated, unchecked power. The
sociology of power and the physics of gravity appear to have something in
common. Astrophysicists tell us that deep in space there are black holes
with so much concentrated mass that anything close becomes captured by
the hole's enormous gravitational force.274  Not even light escapes. In
Rhode Island, so much power became concentrated in the General
Assembly-and more, in the office of the Speaker of the House- that
influence radiated outward, extending deep into the executive branch. 75
The Collins case shows that Madison's concern about concentrated
legislative power "extending the sphere of its activity and drawing power
into its impetuous vortex" remains relevant.
271. See Katherine Gregg, Carl Contender for Dean's Job at URI, PROVIDENCE J., Feb.
7, 2002, at B-01 (reporting that Carl, who holds a doctorate in philosophy and likes to be
addressed as "Dr. Carl," sought to become dean of the College of Human Sciences and
Services at the University of Rhode Island).
272. See Gregg, supra note 264.
273. See Fitzpatrick, Harwood v. Collins- 'Did Nothing Wrong,'supra note 253.
274. See, e.g., BRIAN GREENE, THE ELEGANT UNIVERSE 78-83, 320-44 (1999).
275. One might argue that Lincoln Almond was especially weak because he was a lame-
duck Governor. This is hardly reassuring about gubernatorial power as every reelected
governor is a lame duck during half of his total time in office, and those who are not
reelected are not, almost by definition, politically powerful figures.
One might also ask why the Collins episode came to public attention. Someone
unknown tipped off a radio talk show host, who interviewed a reluctant and ambivalent
Collins at her home. That individual remains unknown. But one wonders whether the
matter would have leaked if Harwood were not already in a considerably weakened political
condition, in large part because of the battle over separation of powers.
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CONCLUSION
On July 30, 2003, both the Rhode Island Senate and House unanimously
approved a constitutional amendment incorporating the doctrine of
separation of powers. 276 I have little doubt that if the votes had been taken
by secret ballot, the amendment would have been defeated. But democracy
worked. Although it took many years-a concerted campaign of nine years
in the modem effort, and 162 years since ratification of the People's
Constitution during the Dorr Rebellion-the people finally got what they
wanted.
This was not a victory of elites. It was truly a victory of the people as a
whole, who made themselves heard in community meetings, calls on talk
radio, letters to the editors, discussions with candidates on the campaign
stump, letters and calls to legislators, and perhaps most importantly of all,
their votes. The campaign was never backed by large sums of money or
promoted with television commercials. To be sure, a cadre of well-
educated and generally prosperous people in Common Cause and
elsewhere stimulated the effort. Still, the campaign succeeded because it
resonated with people from all walks of life and across ethnic, sociological,
and economical spectrums. People may never have heard of Lord Acton or
Montesquieu or read The Federalist Papers, and some may have needed a
reminder about the concept of separation of powers, but they intuitively
grasped the dangers of consolidated power and understood why the
American Founders divided governmental power into three branches.
Rhode Island's adoption of separation of powers will not, by itself, result
in three perfectly balanced branches of government. First, legislative
supremacists have not disappeared. They remain alive and well and have
already begun attempting to pursue their agenda in other ways.277 Second,
276. The House approved the resolution by a vote of sixty-six to zero with eight
members absent, including former Speaker John B. Harwood. With two members absent,
the Senate vote was thirty-six to zero.
The measure amends the Rhode Island Constitution in four ways: (1) it prohibits
members of the legislature from being "appointed to any state office, board, commission or
other state or quasi-public entity exercising executive power;" (2) it declares that the three
branches of government are "separate and distinct;" (3) it deletes a provision that provided
that the "general assembly shall continue to exercise the powers it has exercised heretofore,"
which had been interpreted as preserving all of the powers the legislature exercised in 1663
except those expressly granted to other branches; and (4) it adopts a provision closely
tracking the appointments clause of the U.S. Constitution, giving the Governor the authority
to appoint, with the advice and consent of the Senate, all officials in the executive branch
who have policy making discretion, while permitting inferior officers to be appointed within
their departments by the general officers, the judiciary, or the heads of the departments. See
H.J. Res. 5081 (R.I. 2003); see also Anderson, General Assembly Unanimously Approves
Separation of Powers, supra note 2 (reporting the votes and including text of joint
resolution).
277. See, e.g., Carl T. Bogus, Don't Pollute Bay with 12 Lobbied Pols, PROVIDENCE J.,
May 15, 2003, at B-04 (discussing "legislative supremacists" attempt to give the General
Assembly veto power over administrative regulations).
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though the constitutional amendment adopts the federal system of
appointments within the executive branch, the amendment does not adopt
the federal model in all respects and there will undoubtedly be many
struggles over how the state will implement the doctrine. Tugs of war
between the branches are, of course, a perennial and perhaps healthy
feature of American government. Power between the branches is never in
perfect equipoise and is constantly in flux. For Rhode Island, however, the
victory of separation of powers means that at least that a tug of war can
take place. As disputes arise, the courts will be constitutionally mandated
to keep the branches within their respective realms and to strive for a
appropriate balance of power, as difficult and imperfect as this necessarily
will be.
For other states, the Rhode Island experience may serve as an
admonition to re-evaluate their own doctrines of separation of powers and
the status of the balances of power. As previously noted, 78 legislative
power appears to be expanding in a number of states. Some have
suggested that encroachments by one branch into another's realm of
responsibility are less problematic if they are not hostile, that is, if one
branch abdicates or cedes authority to another branch.279 Yet accretion of
power by any branch, whether or not challenged at the time, presents
difficulties, for power once lost is difficult to retrieve. As one branch
acquires more and more power, it becomes increasingly difficult for other
branches to assert themselves, even within their own domains. 280 Yet, there
is good news from Rhode Island. Its battle teaches that separation of
powers is not merely some arcane theory of political science but rather a
robust part of American ideology. It is an issue that people understand,
care about, and, when necessary, will rally behind. James Madison and the
American Founders would be pleased.
278. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
279. See, e.g., Communication Workers of Am. v. Florio, 617 A.2d 223, 232 (R.I. 1992);
Robert F. Williams, Rhode Island's Distribution of Powers Question of the Century:
Reverse Delegation and Implied Limits on Legislative Powers, 4 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L.
REV. 159, 172 (1998); Gary J. Greco, Standards or Safeguards: A Survey of the Delegation
Doctrine in the States, 8 ADMfN. L.J. AM. U. 567, 588-91 (1994).
280. From Rhode Island's experience, consider for example how officials in the
executive branch worked to protect the Speaker of the House without even reporting to the
Governor what they were doing or the potentially significant political event that precipitated
their actions, and how the Chief Justice of the state supreme court became a patronage
dispenser for the Speaker. See supra notes 262-270 (regarding the Harwood-Collins
episode) and 231-234 (regarding the Chief Justice's appointment of the Speaker's wife to a
life-time judicial position) and accompanying text.
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